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Case No. 20151017-CA 
 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee,  
v. 
JOHNNY BRICKMAN WALL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
INTRODUCTION 
Uta was not alone the night she died. Someone entered her bedroom, 
drugged her, cut her with a knife, and held her under bathwater until she 
drowned. That person then cleaned his bloody footprints from the bedroom 
and bathroom floor and staged the scene to look like a suicide by scattering 
antihistamine pills around the bedroom and throwing Uta’s daughter’s 
scrapbook into the tub with her. 
The State charged—and the jury convicted—Uta’s ex-husband, 
Defendant Johnny Wall, of being that person. Defendant now raises two 
claims on appeal. First, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his murder conviction. He is mistaken. Defendant left clues behind 
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that, viewed together, indisputably show that Uta was murdered and point 
to him as Uta’s killer. 
Second, Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted 
DNA evidence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective when he did not 
object to the State’s presentation and summation of the DNA evidence. 
Again, he is mistaken. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
the DNA evidence because Defendant’s objections went to the weight, not the 
admissibility of the evidence. 
And the State’s presentation and summation of the DNA evidence was 
not so clearly out of bounds that all competent counsel would have objected. 
To the contrary, the testimony did not exceed the boundaries drawn by the 
trial court and the prosecutor’s argument merely drew a proper inference 
from the evidence. 
But in any event, Defendant can show no prejudice where the DNA 
evidence was but one piece in the evidentiary puzzle. Defendant would have 
been convicted without it. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1a. After the jury found him guilty, Defendant moved to arrest 
judgment on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient. The trial court 
denied Defendant’s motion.  Should this Court review Defendant’s 
-3-  
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge when he does not address the reasons 
the trial court denied it below? 
Standard of Review. None applies. 
 
1b. Regardless, did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied 
Defendant’s motion to arrest judgment, concluding that “ample evidence was 
submitted to the jury to support its verdict of guilty”? 
Standard of Review. Appellate courts apply the same standard used in 
deciding sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims. State v. Bolson, 2007 UT App 268, 
¶10, 167 P.3d 539. “In considering an insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim,” 
courts “review the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the verdict” and “will reverse ‘only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted.’” State v. 
Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶15, 345 P.3d 1195 (citation omitted). 
2a. Before trial, Defendant moved to exclude expert testimony about 
the DNA testing of Uta’s white pillowcase, which concluded that Defendant 
was a possible contributor to the sample. Defendant argued that the forensic 
analyst should have disregarded some data, which he claimed if ignored, 
would have excluded Defendant as being a source of the DNA. The State’s 
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expert, however, disagreed. After a full-day evidentiary hearing and 
extensive briefing and argument, the trial court ruled that Defendant’s 
objections went to the evidence’s weight, not its admissibility. The trial court 
ruled that both parties could present their interpretations of the DNA 
evidence to the jury through expert witnesses, cross-examination, and closing 
argument. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion under rule 702(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, by allowing the State’s DNA expert to testify? 
Standard of Review. Appellate courts review a trial court’s decision to 
admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion and will find error “only if 
no reasonable person would take the view the trial court adopted.” State v. 
Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶122, 299 P.3d 892. 
2b. Has Defendant proved that all competent counsel would have 
objected to how the State presented and argued the DNA testimony at trial? 
Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance claim raised for the first 
time on appeal is a question of law. State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶16, 247 P.3d 344. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts. 
Someone murdered Uta Von Schwedler in her home in the early 
morning hours of September 27, 2011. After a lengthy investigation, police 
-5-  
concluded that Uta’s ex-husband, Defendant Johnny Wall, killed her and 
staged the scene to look like she killed herself. After a nearly month-long trial, 
the jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder. 
The murder 
 
Uta’s boyfriend, Nils Abramson, found Uta submerged in her bathtub 
of her home at about 7:45 p.m. on September 27, 2011. R.13288. The cold water 
was running and Uta’s youngest daughter’s scrapbook was floating at her 
feet. R.13288-13289,13294-13296. A newspaper and a Triple A book were in 
the water. R.13298-13299; State’s Exs.45,88,105-107. Uta was wearing only the 
shorts she normally wore to bed; her bloodied tank top was hanging on the 
edge of the tub. R.13299; State’s Exs.89,160,166,167. Uta had three injuries to 
her left wrist—a stab wound on the inside of her wrist, a laceration near the 
stab wound, and another jagged laceration that wrapped around her wrist 
and left a flap of skin hanging. R.13786,13794,13855-13860; State’s Ex.149. 
Uta’s left calf also bore a deep cut. R.13786,6769-6970. Uta’s lower lip was 
bruised and she had an abrasion on her right cheek. R.13786,13790,13792, 
13936-13937; State’s Ex.149,159. 
A kitchen knife lay under Uta’s body in the tub. R.14151-14152; State’s 
Ex.102, 105-107. There was dry blood smeared on the bathroom sink basin as 
well as a bloody palmprint on the tub’s tile below the windowsill. R.6757-
-6-  
6758,6772,6891-6892,6985,14149-14150; State’sEx.85-86,103-104. A blood-
stained purple towel lay on the floor. R.13529,14150. There were drops of dry 
blood on the bathroom floor. R.6984,7500,14149; State’s Ex.43 83-84. Nils 
grabbed Uta’s arm to pull her out of the tub, but she was “stiff.” R.13289. Uta 
was already dead. 
Across the hallway, in Uta’s bedroom, there were signs of a struggle. It 
was in disarray. R.6879-R6885,6935-6936. A lamp was toppled over on the 
bed. R.1817,1818,6935,6987,8808,8866; State’s Ex.43. A vase was knocked from 
the nightstand and onto the floor. R.6935,8866; State’s Ex.44. Books from the 
nightstand were also knocked onto the floor. Id. A striped rug near Uta’s bed 
was kinked and out of position. R.6935. Red antihistamine pills were strewn 
on the floor and into the closet. R.6808,6987-6988. Uta’s comforter was balled 
up at the foot of the bed, covered with several dry bloodstains. R.6880-6881. 
The fitted bedsheet had dry bloodstains as well, one a large pool. R.6881-6883; 
State’s Ex.182-184. Uta’s white pillowcase had a small bloodstain on it. 
R.9092. A green rug at the bottom of her bed had a bloody partial shoeprint, 
made while the blood was “very fresh.” R.13529,13529,13563, State’s Ex.91, 
94,185. And in the kitchen, there were three dry partial bloody shoeprints. 
R.8786,13532,13631,13638,14146-14147;  State’s Ex.45,75,76,79,80. The shoe 
pattern was the same as the print in her bedroom. R.13531-13532.  
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An autopsy later revealed that Uta had drowned. R.13833,7313-7314. 
She had a fatal or near-fatal dose of Xanax in her system. R.13482,13843. But 
Uta never had a prescription for Xanax. R.1879,7023,7544,7547,7584,7594, 
7596,7610, 8002-8003,8818. And no pill bottle for the drug was ever found. 
R.13669. 
“She was full of life” 
 
Friends, family, coworkers, and acquaintances uniformly described 
Uta as “[up]beat,” “energetic,” “friendly,” “cheerful,” “very happy,” and 
“full of  life.”  R.6609,6633,7006,7061,8019,8105,8458,13707.  At work at the 
Huntsman Cancer Center, she was “a lab mother” who brought in homemade 
pies and garden vegetables from home to share. R.2827,8105,13708. She 
enjoyed swimming, running, hiking, skiing, and camping, and went with her 
many friends to events like lectures, concerts, and the theater. R.6610- 
6611,7069-7070,7625,8078,8098. But “Uta’s greatest pleasure in life was the 
love for her four children”: Pelle, age 17, Malkie, 16, L.W., 12, and I.W., 11. 
R.14255;8086,13721. 
Uta had just one unhappiness: her ex-husband. He was the only person 






Marriage and divorce 
 
Uta and Defendant met while they were both studying for their Ph.Ds. 
R.7808-7809,7831,9176. They married in 1990. R.7809. After Defendant also 
obtained a medical degree, the two moved to Utah in 1994 for Defendant’s 
residency. R.7810,7836,14892-14893. But by 2005, the marriage had failed and 
Uta moved out. R.8080. In 2006, Uta and Defendant divorced. R.8082. 
After the divorce, Defendant was “very, very sad.” R.9179,14558-14559. 
But his sadness turned to anger, and then hatred. Id. Defendant believed Uta 
had “ruined his life” and he blamed her for his problems. R.7817. And even 
though Defendant remarried, and then divorced again, he was still “fixated” 
on “all the bad things” Uta had done. R.7823. He told his children and friends 
that it was Uta’s fault that his second wife, Kate, divorced him. R.7673,7847- 
7848,14322. And he “regularly” told the children that Uta was a bad mother, 
and that it was her fault they were unable to have things they wanted or do 
the activities they wanted to do. R.9180-9182,13251,14324,14380-14385,14559; 
State’s Ex.321:5,7. 
Defendant did not want Uta in the children’s lives. In fact, when 
Defendant and Uta divorced, he told a friend that he would “make sure that 
Uta didn’t get the children” or be able to see them. R.14771- 
14772,14774,14779. He tried; he obtained primary physical custody of the 
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children in the divorce. R.9178,14301,14373-14374,14411,14558. But Uta still 
had the children every Thursday evening and every other Thursday through 
Monday. R.9189-9190,13250,14463. 
Uta remained very involved in her children’s lives, picking them up 
from school and soccer practices, and attending their soccer games and music 
performances. R.13270. She hung their pictures and artwork on her walls. 
R.13366. And she spent “many, many hours” creating scrapbooks of them. 
R.9195-9197,13296,14470. But Uta wanted to spend more time with her 
children. R.13261,13709. In 2008, Uta hired an attorney to modify the divorce 
decree for more parenting time. R.14306. The litigation, however, stalled after 
court-ordered mediation. R.14297-14306. Even though they reached an 
agreement, Defendant refused to sign the order. R.14297. Defendant later 
agreed to resolve their dispute over parenting time with a “parent 
coordinator.” R.14313. But he canceled appointments and refused to continue 
after six weeks. R.321:9. 
By 2011, the conflict between Uta and Defendant had “ratchet[ed] up.” 
R.7688,13661. Defendant refused to speak with Uta about a parenting 
schedule and he ignored all of Uta’s emails or texts. R.9138,14348. He 
complained about her to the children “a bunch.” R.14469. And when the 
children were with him, Defendant refused to allow them to communicate 
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with Uta.  R.1885-1886,1888,7693,8243,8250-8251,8255,9186,13261,14319; 
State’s Ex.321:8,33-34. If they texted or talked to Uta, they would get in 
trouble or Defendant would take their phones away. R.1885,1888,8243,8255, 
9186,14469,14555; State’s Ex.321:33-34-37. Once, Uta came into Defendant’s 
yard—instead of staying outside the gate on the sidewalk—and Defendant 
“physically removed her” from his yard. R.14472,14562. 
Uta again filed to review custody in 2011. R.7657,7666-7669; State’s 
Ex.321:3-5. Six days before Nils found Uta dead, Uta moved to appoint a 
custody evaluator. R.7709; State’s Ex.351. That same day, Uta’s attorney 
informed Defendant’s counsel that Uta would file a motion for contempt if 
Defendant continued to refuse to negotiate a parenting schedule or discuss 
Uta’s plans to take the two youngest children, L.W. and I.W., to San Diego 
that coming weekend. R.14356-14357; State’s Ex.321:66. 
Despite Uta’s conflict with Defendant, Uta was the happiest she had 
ever been.  R.1886,1888,7063,6979,8092,8251,8253-8254,8468,9199.   She was 
“excited” about her prospects for gaining custody of the children. R.9168. She 
and Nils were very much in love. R.6632,9192,14474. She was looking forward 
to taking L.W. and I.W. to San Diego. R.2835,6790,8254,8797,13433,13718- 
13719; State’s Exs.359-360. And she had just made a “big discovery” at work 
that could lead to new therapies for childhood leukemia. R.1823,6609,6978. 
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The day before she died, Uta met with her supervisors. They were thrilled, 
calling her work a “breakthrough” and “one of the biggest discoveries” ever 
for the lab. R.2810,2829-2830,2832-2841,2834. 
Defendant, however, was not as happy. By this time, his “life centered 
around … his hate for Uta.” R.7819. He had a “vengefulness” towards her 
and asked friends, “Would it be bad if Uta wasn’t here anymore?” R.7820, 
7838,7859,7870. His coworkers knew that he “despised her” and he said only 
“bad” things about her. R.1884,14690. He once “slammed down” some files 
he was holding and exclaimed, “Wow, that bitch is a cunt.” R.14655-14657. 
He even asked one coworker if she knew a “hit man” and told her to run over 
Uta’s car if she saw it. R.7870. 
Defendant wrote Uta an email, telling her, “I can guarantee that I am 
unwilling to continue with this level of conflict and will take all means 
necessary to stop it.” State’s Ex.321:22. Later, Defendant told an acquaintance 
that he was “getting his kids back.” R.14613,14623. Four days later, Uta was 
dead. 
Uta was “upbeat” and “happy” before she died 
The weekend before she died, Uta and the children camped with 
friends. R.9198,13251-13252,14475. Nils joined them for a hike on Sunday. 
R.13252. Uta was “upbeat” and “happy” over the weekend. R.9199,13269, 
-12-  
14475.  On Monday at work, Uta was also “in an upbeat, happy mood.” 
R3,13624. Monday evening, Uta attended L.W.’s soccer game, and friends 
noticed she “was in a great mood.” R.1886,1888,13432-13433. Afterwards, Uta 
did her regular “deep cleaning” of the house and left the mop outside to dry. 
R.13257,13260,13340; State’s Ex.14. 
Defendant picked up the children at 8:00 p.m. Monday evening. 
R.9202,14479-14480,14527. Defendant pulled into the driveway and honked 
the horn, as he always did. R.14480. He never went inside Uta’s house. R.1885, 
1888,14460-14461,14562. 
Uta came outside to talk with Defendant about her plans to take L.W. 
and I.W. to San Diego over the coming weekend. R.1886,9203- 
9205,13261,13272,14480-14482,14527. But Defendant did not respond. He 
refused to look at Uta, rolled up the window, and drove away. 
R.1886,9205,14481,14527-14528,14563. This behavior was “typical.” 
R.9205,14481,14527-14528. 
Between 9:00 and 10:00 pm that night, Uta’s next-door neighbor saw 
Uta sitting at her dining room table talking on the phone. R.13604,13614. Uta 
was shaking her head and was “animated,” but this was “fairly typical” and 
Uta did not seem upset. Id. Uta also talked to a friend at 10:45 p.m. that night 
about attending a university lecture the next day. R.13719,13721. Uta’s friend 
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thought Uta seemed “normal.” R.13719-13720.   
This was the last time anyone heard from Uta. 
Defendant was not home the morning Uta died 
 
On the day Uta was found dead, Malkie, the couple’s second child, 
woke up at Defendant’s house around 6:00 a.m. to get ready for school. 
R.14483. Defendant was normally home, but although she looked “[a]ll over 
the house,” Defendant and his car were gone. R.14484-14485,14536. Malkie 
called Defendant twice on his cell phone but he did not answer. 
R.8176,8226,14486-14487. 
Defendant usually drove Malkie to the TRAX station, which she took 
to school. R.14485-14486. But with Defendant still not home at 6:45 a.m., 
Malkie left to walk to the station. Id. Defendant still had not returned home 
when Pelle, the couple’s oldest child, left to walk to his school at 7:30 a.m. 
R.9209. 
Defendant was spotted at 7:05 a.m. that morning, however. As Malkie’s 
schoolmate and her mother were driving to school, they saw Defendant 
driving the opposite direction on Foothill Boulevard. R.14575-14578. They 
both thought this odd because Defendant was alone and he was not driving 
Malkie to the TRAX station like he usually did. R.14577. Defendant also was 
not home, helping his youngest two children get ready for school. Id.  
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Defendant arrived late to work that morning. R.8346. He had patients 
scheduled and waiting, so his medical assistant had to “disburse[] them to 
other doctors or reschedule[]” their appointments. R.1883,7867,7969,14666- 
14667. Defendant was late because he had taken his car to be detailed at the 
car wash that morning. R.14593-14594. He asked the attendant to focus on the 
cargo area of the trunk and a spot on the driver’s side backseat. R.14595- 
14597,14602-14603. The attendant did not see anything spilled or stained on 
the front seats. R.14603. 
When Defendant arrived at work, he was “disheveled and anxious” 
and he had not showered or shaved. R.1883,7969,8346,8375. He was wearing 
the same clothes as the day before. R.1883,7969,8346. His left eye was 
“severely red” and bloody, caused by a conjunctival tear—most commonly 
caused by fingernail scratches. R.1883,7945,7948,7969,14637-14639, 
14641,14644,15158; State’s Exs.191-192,355. And Defendant was wearing a 
different pair of glasses than the ones he normally wore. R.9132,9210-9211. 
His normal pair’s left hinge was broken. Id. 
Defendant also had scratches above and below his eye on his left cheek 
that looked like fingernail scratches. R.1883,7948-7949,7969,15126-15127. And 
he had scratches on his forearms.  R.14662-14663,15127,15161.  When 
-15-  
Defendant saw that his medical assistant noticed them, he rolled his sleeves 
down to cover them. R.14663-14664. 
But within a couple of weeks of Uta’s death, Defendant “looked really 
good,” “like a weight had been lifted off his shoulders.” R.14670. He told his 
son Pelle that Uta committed suicide. R.9220. He told his son L.W., “maybe 
it’s better that she’s dead.” R.1889,8256. 
The investigation 
 
Uta’s next-door neighbor told investigators that she heard a sound 
after 3:00 a.m. the morning of September 27, 2011. R.8010-8015. She thought 
she heard someone calling out, but she could not “make out what they were 
saying.” R.8026,8029-8030. 
No one had broken into Uta’s house. R.6648,8787. When Nils arrived, 
the door was unlocked even though Uta locked the doors at night. 
R.6649,9225. Just days after Uta’s death, Pelle discovered that the spare key 
Uta left outside for the children was gone. R.8824-8825. It was never found. 
Id. 
Police compared the bloody shoeprints in Uta’s kitchen to the shoes of 
the first responders, Nils, and Uta’s ex-boyfriend, Jack Skalicky. R.14705- 
14711,14714-14715. None matched. R.14716,14721. They also found no shoes 
in Uta’s bathroom or kitchen.  R.8893-8894.  The shoes police did find 
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elsewhere in the house did not have blood on them. Id. In fact, Uta did not 
allow shoes to be worn in the house. R.8095,13285. 
Forensic testing revealed that there were also bloody prints—similar to 
the prints in the kitchen—on Uta’s bedroom and bathroom floors, and one 
bloody spot on Uta’s wall above her headboard. R.14727-14736; State’s 
Exs.142-143. None of these prints, however, were visible to Nils and the first 
responders because they had been cleaned up before anyone arrived. Id. 
When Nils arrived, the blinds were down in Uta’s bedroom although she had 
“never” put them down before. R.8020-8021,8895,13303. Putting the blinds 
down would have allowed Uta’s killer to turn on the light and clean up the 
bloody prints without being seen. But the kitchen—where three bloody 
shoeprints were not cleaned up—had no blinds. R.8895. 
A crime scene reconstructionist concluded that Uta had been murdered 
and that her killer staged the scene to look like she had killed herself. R.13574. 
He explained that the blood patterns on Uta’s comforter and sheet showed 
that a “violent struggle” occurred as Uta struggled “under a restraint.” 
R.13518,13522-13524,13518. He also pointed out a swipe—possibly made by 
a glove—through a bloody handprint on the comforter. R.13515-13516,13559. 
He also explained that Uta’s tank top front, but not the back, had a 
“saturation stain,” which he believed showed that Uta’s bleeding wrist had 
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been held tight to her chest while it was bleeding, as if it had been pinned to 
her. R.13555-13556. He did not believe that Uta had taken off her tank top 
because it had no bloody handprints or blood around the hem or straps. 
R.13510,13558. 
The crime scene reconstructionist further determined that the bloody 
palmprint under the bathtub’s windowsill and the swipe on the sink basin 
were from Uta being “push[ed]” as she “struggle[d].” R.13534- 
13535,13539,13573-13575. He further concluded that the blood patterns at the 
scene were inconsistent with Uta being intoxicated and stumbling about. He 
explained that there were no blood swipes on the walls or light switches, 
dripping blood patterns where Uta walked, or blood pools where she fell, as 
ones sees in intoxication cases. R.8894,13540. Indeed, there was no blood on 
any light switches or the bathroom faucets at all. 
R.6897,6936,7512,8802,13293,14161; State’s Exs. 111-112.  And when Nils 
arrived, only the bathroom light was on. R.13284. 
The crime scene reconstructionist finally explained that blood begins 
to dry instantly and dries completely in three to six minutes. R.13498,13523. 
Once dry, blood does not return to its original form if rewetted. R.13531- 
13533. So if someone steps into dried blood with wet shoes, the blood will not 
make a new bloody shoeprint, but instead “flake” off. Id. 
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Uta’s autopsy revealed that besides the injuries to Uta’s face, leg, and 
wrist, Uta also had two internal hemorrhages in her neck, which were 
consistent with strangulation or pressure being applied to her neck. R.13803- 
13804; State’s Exs.150-151. The medical examiner’s investigator further noted 
“petechia” in Uta’s right eye—small hemorrhages in the eye that also indicate 
strangulation. R.13900-13902. 
The autopsy showed that Uta did not have remnants of Xanax pills in 
her stomach, which is usually found in overdoses. R.13811,7196,7302-7303. 
Rather, Uta had high levels of Xanax in her blood and liver. R.7261,13950- 
13951. The medical examiner believed this could possibly show that Uta had 
been injected with Xanax or forced to swallow a “slurry.” R.13812,13853. If 
injected, the injection site was not visible, which is not unusual, or it could 
have been covered up by the stab wound to her wrist. R.9993,13812,13845- 
13846,13851,13893-13894. Xanax is a sedative used for anxiety and nervous 
disorders and because it is fast acting, with a high dose, the onset of 
symptoms—which include sleepiness and losing consciousness—would 
have been within minutes. R.1876,13807,13840,13854-13855,13892- 
13896,13919. 
The medical examiner concluded that the injuries to Uta’s wrist and leg 
were not self-inflicted, but were “defensive.” R.13792,13798-13799, 13801-
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13802,13896-13899. And although he believed that the manner of death was 
“more consistent” with homicide, because of the presence of Xanax, he 
decided that he was unable “to form an opinion within a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty” and selected Uta’s manner of death as undetermined. 
R.13819-13820,13833-13836. 
Two forensic pathologists reviewed the autopsy findings. They both 
concluded that Uta’s manner of death was homicide. R.10029-10030,13962. 
They agreed that Uta’s wrist and leg wounds were not self-inflicted, but were 
defensive wounds. R.9993-9994,13938,13941-13943,13969-13971. And because 
the levels of Xanax in Uta’s stomach were very low while the levels in her 
blood were high, they believed that Uta did not swallow Xanax pills but was 
injected or given a slurry. R.10003-10004,13940-13941,13951,13957,13974. 
Investigators found that Uta was never prescribed Xanax. R.1879,8002- 
8003,14193,14196,14233,14243,14259. And no one saw her take Xanax, heard 
her say that she had taken it, or saw a prescription bottle. R.1882,8005,8092- 
8093,9201-9202,13314,13656. Uta never noted Xanax on her “medicine 
calendar,” where she dutifully documented medications she took. R.13311- 
13312,13375,13663; State’s Ex.334-335. In it, she noted her medication for 
asthma, occasional anti-inflammatory medicine for elbow and back pain, and 
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over-the-counter allergy and cold medications. R.13311,13350,13664,13671-
13672,14194-14195,14243. 
While Uta had never been prescribed Xanax, Defendant wrote a 
prescription for Xanax for his mother—who lives in California—in the 
highest possible dosage just four months before Uta died. R.1875,1879,7271- 
7272,7975,7982-7984,7991-7992, 8003; State’s Ex.356. Defendant picked up the 
prescription the following day at a pharmacy he had never used before—or 
since. R.1880,7978-7979,8817. 
Investigators also learned that Uta did not take baths. 
R.9189,13377,14465. She had Raynaud’s disease, a condition where she could 
not control the temperature in her fingers and it made taking a bath of cold 
water painful. R.14209-14210,14231-14232. 
Investigators did not collect or test the residue from the bathtub. 
R.14169. But they did submit several items from the crime scene to Sorensen 
Forensics for DNA analysis. Sorensen Forensics analyzed blood stains on the 
fitted sheet; Uta’s tank top; the purple towel; blood from one of the bloody 
footprints in the kitchen; the knife; scrapings from Uta’s right fingernails; 
Uta’s bed comforter; the white pillowcase; and a piece of fabric from the 
backseat of Defendant’s Subaru, where Defendant has asked the carwash 
attendant to focus his cleaning. R.8815,8985,8990,8991,9008,9014,9020-9021. 
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This analysis determined that Defendant was a possible contributor to the 
DNA on the white pillowcase and on the comforter, and he could not be 
excluded or included as a possible contributor to the male DNA under Uta’s 
right fingernails. R.4515. But nine others could be excluded as a source of the 
male DNA under Uta’s fingernails, all of whom either had contact with Uta’s 
body around her time of death or were possible suspects: Nils and Uta’s ex- 
boyfriend Jack Salicky. Id. 
Investigators finally noted that Uta did not leave a suicide note. R.1822, 
6978. No one who knew Uta had seen her depressed. R.2840,8091-8092,9179- 
9180,9228,13433,13707,13722,14185-14186,14242,14461-14462,14774-14775. 
And of all 111 witnesses that police interviewed, only one person claimed Uta 
had been depressed or suicidal—Defendant. R.8896. 
Defendant tells police he does not know where he was the night Uta died 
Police interviewed Defendant the night Uta was found dead. R.14843. 
Even though they did not tell Defendant why they wanted to talk with him, 
Defendant did not ask any questions and accompanied them to the police 
station. R.14845-14846. There, he told the police that the last time he had seen 
Uta was the night before when he picked up the children from her house. 
R.14872-14873. Although he initially said that he stayed in the car, he later 
said “I think I got out of the car for a moment,” but he was not sure. R.14950-
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14951. He also could not remember if he had touched Uta anytime that week. 
R.14930,14947-14948. He said that he had been in Uta’s house before, but he 
could not say when that had been. R.14926. And when asked if there was any 
reason his DNA would be under Uta’s fingernails, Defendant responded, “I 
don’t know.” R.14931. 
Defendant told police that he left his house that morning at about 6:45 
or 7:00 a.m. to pick up eggs at the 7-11. R.14875-14877. He took his car to the 
carwash that morning because he “had extra time” and there were “burritos 
spilled all over” the front passenger seat. R.14917-14919,14996. He also told 
police that his dog, Molly, had scratched his eye during the night when he 
was sleeping outside. R.14878-14881. But Defendant told the police that he 
could not say if he had been home all night or if he had gone back to Uta’s 
house. R.14956-14957,14969. Instead, he told them, “I don’t know where the 
fuck I was!” R.14962. 
Later, Pelle told police that he sat in the front passenger seat when 
Defendant picked them up from Uta’s house the night before she was found 
dead, and there was nothing spilled on the front passenger seat. R.9204. 
Defendant makes inconsistent statements in a deposition 
 
Before the DNA results were returned, but while Defendant knew the 
tests were pending, Defendant was deposed in a civil case. His story changed 
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to potentially account for the return of the DNA results. For example, 
Defendant now claimed that when he picked up the children from Uta’s 
house, Uta came out, opened the driver’s side rear passenger door and 
hugged I.W.—the very spot where police had taken a swatch of fabric to test 
for DNA. State’s Ex.332:15:20. To account for his DNA potentially being 
under Uta’s fingernails, Defendant said that after Molly had scratched him 
during the night, he got up and noticed that the lights were on in his 
basement. State’s Ex.329:9:20. As he walked into the basement to turn off the 
lights, he claimed to see Uta leaving through the garage door. Id. He said that 
he chased her, but Uta turned around and hit him in the face with her hand. 
Id. Uta then ran off. Id. Defendant claimed that Uta had broken into his 
basement “multiple times in previous months,” but that he never reported 
her to the police. Id. at 9:27-28,10:34. 
To account for his DNA being in Uta’s bedroom, Defendant said that 
he had been in Uta’s bedroom several times. State’s Ex.331:14:10. He claimed 
that Uta had invited him over to talk and look at the children’s scrapbooks. 
Id. Once, he declared, Uta tried to seduce him, but he declined. Id. Defendant 
said that the last time he had been in Uta’s bedroom was a month before she 
died. State’s Ex.381:154.  
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Finally, Defendant accounted for his whereabouts the morning Uta 
was killed but did not repeat his story that he went to get eggs at the 7-11. 
This time, he said that after Uta hit him, he went to his bedroom to sleep, but 
woke around 5:00 a.m. State’s Ex.329:9:48. He decided to go to Primary 
Children’s Hospital to work on his charts, but when he realized that he forgot 
his identification, he went for a hike in Emigration Canyon before the sun 
rose. Id. 
A Primary Children’s Hospital’s medical records liaison later 
explained that the office is not open before 8:00 a.m. and doctors cannot 
access it outside of office hours. R.8038-8043. 
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
Defendant was charged with first degree murder. R.3-7. Defendant’s 
theory at trial was that Uta either committed suicide or it was an accident. He 
contended that the knife wounds were self-inflicted and that she had taken 
Xanax voluntarily. And he claimed that the disturbed items in her bedroom 
were not signs of a struggle, but that she was under the influence of Xanax 
and was having difficulty with her balance and coordination as she made her 
way into the bathroom. 
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Defendant also pointed to Nils as the likely killer: his DNA was 
detected on several items in the bedroom and his whereabouts were 
unknown from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. the day Uta was found murdered. 
The jury returned a guilty verdict. R.1944,1969,10291. Post-trial, 
Defendant moved to arrest judgment on the grounds that, as relevant here, 
the evidence was insufficient, R.2022-2045,2561-2568; and that the State had 
presented some of the DNA evidence in a misleading manner, R.2049-2059, 
2572-2575. The trial court denied both motions. R.3471-3480. Defendant 
timely appealed. R.3503-3504. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied his motion to arrest judgment because, according to him, it 
was more likely that Uta committed suicide than she was murdered. As a 
threshold matter, this Court should not consider this claim because he has 
not challenged the trial court’s reasons for rejecting it below. But regardless, 
the trial court acted within its discretion to deny the motion because the 
evidence was not so inconclusive or improbable that it should not have 
submitted the case to the jury. Indeed, the evidence amply supported the 
jury’s verdict where it showed that (1) it was unlikely that Uta would have 
attempted suicide when she was happy and excited for the future; (2) it was 
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unlikely that Uta would have attempted to strangle herself, inject herself with 
Xanax, dispose of the Xanax pill bottle, and clean bloody footprints from her 
bedroom and bathroom before she died; (3) the blood spatter and Uta’s 
physical injuries showed a struggle occurred in Uta’s bedroom and 
bathroom; (4) Defendant was the only one with the means, motive, and 
opportunity to kill Uta; (5) Defendant had injuries to his left eye and face 
consistent with a struggle and Uta had male DNA underneath her right 
fingernail; and (6) Defendant gave inconsistent versions of his whereabouts 
the night Uta was killed. 
Point IIA. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied his motion to exclude the State’s expert testimony about the 
DNA on Uta’s white pillowcase. He contends that the trial court should have 
excluded the testimony because it fell below the reliability requirement in 
rule 702(b), Utah Rule of Evidence. But the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion to admit the State’s DNA expert’s testimony, because Defendant’s 
objections went to the evidence’s weight, not its admissibility. Rule 702 
allows the jury to do its traditional job—determine which of two qualified, 
but competing expert opinions was more convincing. 
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Defendant was not prejudiced in any event because the DNA was just 
a piece of the evidentiary puzzle and Defendant would have been convicted 
without it. 
Point IIB. Defendant finally argues that his counsel should have 
objected to (1) the State’s eliciting expert DNA testimony that, according to 
him, went beyond what the trial court permitted; and (2) the prosecutor 
overstating the DNA evidence in closing argument. But Defendant has not 
proved that all competent counsel would have objected to how the State 
presented and argued the DNA evidence at trial. In fact, there was no reason 
for counsel to object because the State’s experts did not exceed the boundaries 
drawn by the trial court. And the prosecutor’s summation was not so 
improper that counsel’s only defensible choice was to interrupt those 
comments with an objection. But again, Defendant suffered no prejudice in 
any event, because even without the DNA evidence, Defendant would have 





THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT RULED THAT AMPLE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED 
THE JURY’S GUILTY VERDICT 
Defendant asks this Court to “vacate the verdict” because, according 
to him, “it was based upon speculation.” Br.Aplt.58. He contends that 
because “the evidence does not make homicide more likely” than suicide, the 
evidence was speculative and did not “extinguish reasonable doubt.” 
Br.Aplt.27. 
As a threshold matter, this Court should not consider this claim 
because Defendant has not challenged the trial court’s reasons for rejecting it 
below. But regardless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendant’s motion to arrest judgment because the evidence was not so 
inconclusive or improbable that it should not have submitted the case to the 
jury. 
A. This Court should not consider Defendant’s insufficiency- of-
the-evidence claim because he has not challenged the trial 
court’s reasons for rejecting it below. 
Post-verdict, Defendant moved to arrest judgment, arguing that the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. R.2022-2044. 
Specifically, he contended that the State had not proved “the manner of death 
was homicide” because the inferences from the trial evidence were 
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speculative where they supported “multiple possible inferences,” R.2027,—
both homicide and suicide—and “‘none [were] more likely than the other.’” 
R.2026 (quoting State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ¶16, 238 P.3d 1096, and 
citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993)). 
The trial court denied this claim. It distinguished Cristobal and 
Workman because, unlike in those cases, here there was “a very large quantum 
of evidence” that “support[ed] the conclusion that a homicide occurred,” 
including the crime scene reconstructionist’s testimony about blood spatter 
showing that “there was a violent struggle”; the medical examiner’s and the 
forensic pathologists’ testimony about Uta’s defensive wounds and neck 
hemorrhages showing that she had been attacked; and expert testimony 
about how Defendant may have administered Xanax to Uta. R.10334-10335, 
3472-3473. The trial court further noted that evidence of Defendant’s motive, 
opportunity, the “inexplicable injuries” to Defendant’s eye, “the strange 
behavior that took place after the incident, the changing of his story between 
what he told the police versus what he said in his deposition,” all supported 
the conclusion not only that Uta was murdered, but that Defendant was the 
one who did it. R.10336, 3472. 
Defendant notes this ruling only in a brief two-sentence statement in 
his statement of the case. See Br.Aplt.21. But Defendant never addresses the 
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trial court’s ruling or challenges its reasoning. Instead, he argues anew, again 
citing Workman and Cristobal, that the evidence is insufficient to support his 
conviction because there are multiple inferences from the evidence and none 
“make[s] homicide more likely.” Br.Aplt.27, 23-40. 
This is insufficient to meet his burden on appeal. Where, as here, the 
trial court has already ruled on the defendant’s claim, the defendant must 
challenge the bases for the trial court’s ruling. “Since an appeal is a resort to 
a superior court to review the decision of a lower court, Utah appellate rules 
require the appellant to address [the] reasons why the district court’s 
[decision] should be overturned.” Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶14, 194 P.3d 903; 
Ellis v. State, 2014 UT App 50, ¶5, 321 P.3d 1174 (per curiam) (same). When 
he fails to do so, this Court must reject the claim. See Gollaher v. State, 2017 UT 
App 168, ¶13, 405 P.3d 831, 834–35, cert. denied, 409 P.3d 1048 (Utah 2017) 
(explaining that “[t]o carry his burden of persuasion on appeal, an appellant 
must address ‘the actual basis for the district court’s ruling.’”); State v. 
Newton, 2018 UT App 194, ¶20, P.3d (dismissing claim without review 
because Newton made same arguments on appeal that he made in motion for 
new trial, but did not challenge the trial court’s ruling). Because Defendant 
has not addressed the reasons the trial court denied his motion to arrest 
judgment based on insufficient evidence, this Court should reject his claim 
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that it should reverse on insufficient evidence. Needham, 2016 UT App 235, 
¶2, 391 P.3d 295 (rejecting Needham’s challenge on appeal where he failed to 
address “the basis of the trial court’s ruling”). 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendant’s motion to arrest judgment because the evidence 
was not so inconclusive or improbable that it should not have 
submitted the case to the jury. 
When considering an insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, appellate 
courts “review the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the verdict” and “will reverse ‘only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted.’” State v. 
Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶15, 345 P.3d 1195; accord State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶33, 
84 P.3d 1183 (explaining that so long as there is “some evidence” supporting 
each element, the verdict stands). This standard of review is “‘highly 
deferential,’” Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶68 (quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶30, 
326 P.3d 645), and reviewing courts “do not consider possible alternatives.” 
Id. at ¶73. Rather, they “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Defendant’s argument on appeal does not show that the jury relied on 
speculation, but only that it chose the State’s theory of the evidence over his.  
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But as the constitutionally designated factfinder, a jury can and must decide 
where the truth lies by sifting and evaluating the evidence and choosing 
whom to believe. As long as there is “any evidence, however slight or 
circumstantial, which tends to show the guilt of the crime charged,” courts are 
duty-bound to submit the case to the jury. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶33 (emphasis 
added). 
Indeed, the inference of suicide is not more likely than homicide; 
suicide cannot account for all of the evidence here. Someone left bloody 
shoeprints in the bedroom, bathroom, and kitchen and then cleaned them 
from the bedroom and bathroom before Nils and first responders arrived. But 
a person committing suicide does not clean up the scene before they die. 
Someone injected Uta with a near-lethal dose of Xanax and then took 
the pill bottle with him; the pill bottle was never found in Uta’s home. But a 
person committing suicide does not dispose of their pill bottle so that it 
cannot be found. 
Someone strangled Uta causing hemorrhages in her neck and petechia 
in her eye. But a person committing suicide does not strangle themselves. Uta 
had further injuries consistent with a struggle and the blood spatter evidence 
showed that a “violent struggle” occurred on her bed. 
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The evidence pointed to Defendant as the most likely someone.  He 
was the only person with the opportunity, means, and motive to kill Uta. He 
had the medical knowledge necessary to select the drug that would 
incapacitate her, and he knew how to inject her. He had recently obtained a 
prescription for the strongest possible dosage of Xanax, purportedly for his 
mother who lived out of State. Defendant was not home at the time Uta was 
killed and he gave inconsistent accounts of his whereabouts. That morning, 
he arrived late to work and took his car to be washed even though patients 
were waiting for him. Defendant had not changed his clothes from the day 
before, he had a scratch on his left eye and cheek consistent with a human 
nail, and his eyeglasses were broken on the left side. When police questioned 
Defendant that evening, he did not ask why they wanted to talk to him. And 
he told them that he could not remember almost everything he had done the 
night before. Then months later, he gave a detailed account of that night in 
an unbelievable story that was not only inconsistent with what he had 
previously old the police, but that would potentially account for the pending 
DNA tests. Defendant was the only person who hated Uta, the woman whom 
he believed had ruined his life and had recently filed to modify custody. He 
had expressed to others his wish that Uta were dead and after Uta died, he 
told his son that it was better that she was gone.  And the purported 
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explanation for the suicide—depression—came only from Defendant. 
Everyone else described her as happy, upbeat, in love, and excited for the 
future. 
 The evidence amply supported the jury’s verdict where it showed that 
it was unlikely that Uta would have attempted suicide when she was happy 
and excited for the future; (2) it was unlikely that Uta would have attempted 
to strangle herself, inject herself with Xanax, dispose of the Xanax pill bottle, 
and clean bloody footprints from her bedroom and bathroom before she died; 
(3) the blood spatter and Uta’s physical injuries showed a struggle occurred 
in Uta’s bedroom and bathroom; (4) Defendant was the only one with the 
means, motive, and opportunity to kill Uta; (5) Defendant had injuries to his 
left eye and face consistent with a struggle and Uta had male DNA 
underneath her right fingernail; and (6) Defendant gave inconsistent versions 
of his whereabouts the night Uta was killed. 
The evidence was clear: Uta was murdered. And Defendant was the 
one who murdered her. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION TO ADMIT THE STATE’S DNA EXPERT’S 
TESTIMONY, AND DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVED 
THAT ALL COMPETENT COUNSEL WOULD HAVE 
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OBJECTED TO HOW THE STATE PRESENTED AND 
ARGUED THE DNA EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
Defendant also attacks the DNA evidence. He contends that the trial 
court abused its discretion under rule 702(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, when 
it allowed the State’s experts to testify about the DNA analysis of Uta’s white 
pillowcase (Item 25.1). Br.Aplt.45-46. Defendant also argues that his counsel 
was ineffective for not objecting to (1) the State’s eliciting expert DNA 
testimony that, according to him, went beyond what the trial court permitted, 
and (2) the prosecutor overstating the DNA evidence in closing argument. 
Defendant’s claims fail. First, his rule 702 challenge goes to the weight 
of the evidence, not its admissibility. And second, Defendant has not proved, 
as he must, that all competent counsel would have objected to how the State 
presented and argued the DNA evidence. Regardless, the DNA evidence was 
not the linchpin of the State’s case, but one piece in the evidentiary puzzle. 
Defendant would have been convicted without it. 
A. Background of DNA testing and proceedings below. 
In order to understand Defendant’s claims on appeal, the State 
provides a detailed background of DNA testing generally, the DNA evidence 
in this case, and Defendant’s challenges to the DNA evidence below. 
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1. DNA analysis. 
DNA defines who we are. It is a genetic blueprint made up of 23 pairs 
of chromosomes and is found in the nuclei of most cells in the human body. 
R.4467,8970. Twenty-two of the chromosomal pairs are called “autosomal” 
and control non-sex traits. R.4467-4468,5255,5278,8970-8971. The twenty- 
third chromosomal pair is sex determining, made up of an X and X 
chromosome for women, and an X and Y chromosome for men. Id. Apart 
from identical twins, no one’s DNA is the same as someone else’s. R.4467, 
8970. Yet only one percent of our DNA differs from person to person and 
distinguishes individuals. R.4467,4499,8969. It is this one percent of DNA that 
forensics targets to identify who left their DNA behind at crime scenes. 
R.8971,9032. 
In this one percent of individualized DNA, patterns repeat themselves 
at certain locations along the genome. R.8973-8974. Called short tandem 
repeats, or STRs, the number of times a pattern repeats itself lets us place 
distinguishing labels on the STR pattern at that location—called an allele. For 
example, if the pattern repeats 11 times, the allele at that location is an 11. 
R.4489,8974. At each location, or locus, an individual has a pair of alleles— 
one from each chromosome and inherited from each biological parent. 
R.4489,5254,5257. So if someone inherited an 11 allele from their mother and 
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a 15 allele from their father, they will be 11, 15 at that locus with an STR 
pattern repeating 11 times at one allele and 15 times at the other. 
Autosomal STR analysis targets 16 of these individualized STR 
locations, or alleles, along the 22 autosomal chromosomes. R.4499. There are 
five steps.1 First is extraction. In this step, the analyst extracts DNA from the 
cells and isolates it from other cellular materials. R.4495,5412,8972,9028-9029. 
Next, in the quantification step, the analyst quantifies the extracted DNA to 
determine how much DNA was isolated at those 16 loci. R.4501,5412, 
8972,9029. The third step is called amplification. Similar to a “DNA 
photocopier” or “Xerox machine,” the analyst copies the DNA. Using 
polymerase chain reaction, the DNA “ladder” is split down the middle. 
R.4502,5260,5410,8972,9030; State’s Ex.382, p.7. The DNA then re-bonds with 
chemicals to produce a ladder identical to the original so that there are twice 
the number of complete ladders. R.9030-9031. This process is repeated for 
several cycles until millions of copies have been made. State’s Ex.382, p.7. 
In the fourth step, the analyst injects the DNA with a fluorescent dye 
and runs it through an electrophoresis machine. R.5410-5411,9031-9032. This 
machine measures the alleles’ fluorescence in relative fluorescent units 
                                                     
1 Forensic DNA analysists use commercial kits for the first four steps. 
R.5260, 5331-5332. 
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(RFUs). R.4502,9032,9034. A software program then puts this information into 
a graph, called an electropherogram. R.4502,5257. Alleles are expressed as 
peaks on the electropherogram at the 16 tested loci. R.5257,8974,9033. Two 
peaks will appear at each locus—one for each allele, unless someone 
inherited the same allele from both parents, and then only one peak will be 
“visible” at that locus.2  R.8975. The peaks appear taller or shorter depending 
on how much DNA is present at that allele. R.5284. 
In the final step of autosomal STR DNA analysis, a forensic DNA 
analyst interprets the data from the electropherogram and compares it to 
other DNA profiles. R.4464,8980,8988. By assessing the number of peaks, 
peak heights, the allele numbers, and other relevant information, the analyst 
can often determine if a person’s DNA profile “matches” the DNA left at a 
crime scene. R.8988-8989. A person is “included” as a possible contributor to 
the DNA left at the crime scene if all the person’s alleles are the same as the 
crime scene DNA’s at every locus. In contrast, if a person’s alleles are 
different at least one locus—for example, the person has 11 and 15 alleles at 
one locus, but the crime scene DNA has an 11 and 23 at that same locus— the 
profiles do not match and the individual is excluded. R.8989,9069. 
                                                     
2 Where two alleles appear, the locus is called a heterozygote locus. 
Where one appears, it is a homozygote locus. 
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Exclusion is “absolute” because the forensic analyst can “say for 
certainty” that the person’s DNA and the crime scene DNA are not the same. 
R.4482, R.5338. Inclusion, on the other hand, is not absolute. It requires a 
statistical weight to show the probability that the match is not random. 
R.4492. Using what is called the product rule method, the forensic analyst 
determines the frequency statistic at each locus and then multiplies those 
frequencies together to get a final probability statistic. R.4492,8978. The 
higher the statistic, the lower the probability that it is not a coincidental 
match. For example, if the statistic is one in 1.55 billion Caucasians, it means 
that it is 1.55 billion times more probable that the person’s DNA and the crime 
scene’s DNA are the same than a coincidental match. 
When every allele matches at all 16 loci, the probability of a random 
match becomes a statistical impossibility. But when the sample contains more 
than one person’s DNA or the DNA profile does not contain all 16 alleles, the 
statistic is lower and the probability of a random match is greater. 
Y-STR analysis is the same as autosomal STR DNA analysis except that 
this testing examines only loci on the male Y-chromosome. R.5273,8976. 
Unlike an STR profile that is unique to each individual, the Y-STR profile is 
inherited in whole and all men in their paternal line have an identical Y-STR 
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profile, barring a mutation. R.4468,8977-8978. That means a son will have the 
same Y-STR profile as his brother, father, grandfather, and on up the line. 
The statistical analysis for Y-STR DNA testing is also different. Because 
only the single Y-chromosome is analyzed and there are no sister alleles, 
forensic analysts use the “counting method” to “count” the number of times 
that the same Y-profile is found in a national population database.3  R.4470, 
4513,8978-8979. This statistic is “much, much lower” than autosomal STR’s 
product rule statistic. R.4487,8979. In other words, the probability of a 
random match is higher for a Y-STR profile. 
When interpreting and comparing DNA profiles, forensic analysts also 
watch for any “stochastic effects.” Stochastic effects are imperfections— 
random additions to or subtractions from the DNA sample that may appear 
on the electropherogram. R.5267. There are five common stochastic effects. 
One, “drop-in” is the appearance of an allele that is not actually part of the 
DNA sample. Drop-in can occur from contamination of the sample. 
Two, “drop-out” is the failure of an allele from the sample to register 
at one or more loci. R.5264-5267. When a sample is degraded or there are very 
low levels of DNA, the alleles can dimly fluorescence, making them difficult 
                                                     
3 One of the 16 loci tested in Y-STR DNA analysis, however, does have 
two alleles. R.5291-5292. 
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to detect. Id. An allele can also fail to amplify. Drop-out can make a 
heterozygote locus—a locus where there are two different alleles—appear 
like a homozygote one—a locus where only one peak is visible because the 
person inherited the same allele from both parents. Or drop-out can make a 
locus disappear with no allele appearing at all. 
Three, “stutter” is an echo effect where a DNA strand slips during 
amplification and “leaks” back to the previous locus. R.5262. Stutter appears 
on the electropherogram as a much smaller peak immediately preceding the 
neighbor allele it echoes. 
Four, “peak imbalance” occurs when one allele is amplified to a greater 
extent than the other allele at that locus, creating more copies of one allele in 
comparison to the other. See U.S. v. Morgan, 53 F.Supp.3d 732, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). As a result, one peak will be higher than the other allele at that locus, 
making it appear that one allele is present to a much greater extent than the 
other allele. Id. 
Finally, an electropherogram can also show “instrument noise” which 
is background signals from the electrophoresis machine. R.5263. Instrument 
noise appears as very low peaks on the electropherogram and is not DNA. 
R.5263. 
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Analysts can typically identify stochastic effects and disregard them. 
For example, true DNA peaks are all relatively close in height. R.5257. True 
DNA also has a rounder peak than non-DNA and shows up at specific places, 
called bins, on the electropherogram. R.9955. Drop-in alleles, stutter, and 
instrument noise also have only a fraction of the peak height of true DNA 
and can appear outside the proper bins. 
Forensic laboratories can also minimize the occurrence of stochastic 
effects by following forensic DNA analysis guidelines, like those from the 
Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM), and 
establishing policies at their labs. For example, forensic DNA testing 
laboratories may establish standard operating procedures, which are “step 
by step instructions … on how each process is done.” R.4502,5405,8965. 
Forensic analysts may also run “validation tests” for each test to see how the 
DNA test kit “behaves” on the lab’s instruments and how “sensitive” it is. 
R.5267,5331. When testing the DNA, analysts may run positive and negative 
controls alongside the tested DNA sample. A positive control is another 
sample whose results are known so that the analyst can confirm that there 
was no error in any of the DNA analysis steps. R.4502. Negative controls test 
for contamination and “should be blank” to show that “there was no 
contamination.” R.4502-4503,8966. 
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Finally, forensic analysts should also establish two thresholds—the 
stochastic threshold and the analytic threshold—every time before they test 
a DNA sample. The stochastic threshold determines a minimum peak height 
above which the analyst is “confident” that sister alleles have not dropped 
out.4 R.5268,5270,5392,5408. The analytical threshold is lower than the 
stochastic threshold and “defines the minimum height requirement at and 
above which detected peaks can be reliably distinguished from background 
noise.” R.5406. In other words, if a peak is above the analytical threshold, the 
analysts can be “confident” that it is DNA and not instrument noise. 
R.5269,9048,9067. 
Implementation of these policies and procedures, however, does not 
mean that DNA analysis is always straightforward or that analysts will 
interpret a DNA profile the same way. Indeed, analysis can become more 
complicated—and is thus more open to interpretation—when a DNA sample 
is mixed, the sample is degraded, or the sample contains a very small amount 
of DNA, called low template. 
                                                     
4 Y-STR DNA testing, however, does not require a stochastic threshold. 
R.5291-5292, 5301. Y-STR testing targets alleles only on the Y chromosome so 
there are only single alleles at each tested loci (except one). There is thus no 
concern that a sister allele will drop out. Id. 
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 A sample is mixed when it contains more than one person’s DNA. 
R.5271. A mixed sample will appear on an electropherogram with more than 
two peaks at the tested loci. R.5257,8974,9043-9044. Although the sample may 
appear to be a “genetic soup,” analysts can still identify contributors to a 
mixed-source sample by comparing a person’s alleles at each loci to those in 
the sample. R.15264. If all a person’s alleles are present in the crime scene 
DNA sample, that person is a “possible contributor.” An analyst can also 
determine who are the major and minor contributors to the sample because a 
minor contributor’s peaks are shorter than the major contributor’s, who 
contributed more DNA. R.5284,8994,8997,9045. The probability of a random 
match is greater in a mixed-source sample because a forensic analyst has to 
“account” for all the possible contributors. R.4492,4524-4525. 
DNA degradation occurs when DNA has been broken into pieces by 
exposure to moisture, heat, chemicals, bacteria, and the like. R.5271. When 
this occurs, alleles may be missing at one or more of the tested loci and the 
resulting DNA profile is called a “partial profile.” If enough alleles are 
present, however, an analysist can still make comparisons between the 
samples. 
 Finally, low template samples are more prone to stochastic effects. 
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2. Sorensen Forensics. 
Sorensen Forensics is a private forensic DNA lab that performed the 
DNA testing in this case. Sorensen follows SWGDAM guidelines. R.5406. As 
recommended, Sorensen has established standard operating procedures, and 
they run validation tests and positive and negative controls for every sample 
they test. R.4502-4503,5267,5331,8966. In addition, every forensic report that 
a Sorensen analyst prepares undergoes a “technical review” by another 
analyst before it is released. R.8967. 
Sorensen established two policies that are relevant here. First, if they 
obtain only a partial profile from a crime scene sample, alleles must be 
present at at least 7 loci for Sorensen to make any inclusionary conclusions. 
R.4484,4521,5294. This sample is termed “[s]uitable for comparison,” and the 
analyst can make both inclusionary and exclusionary conclusions. If 
someone’s alleles match all the crime scene sample’s alleles, he is deemed a 
possible contributor to the sample. But Sorensen will use only the present loci 
for its statistical probability calculations, making the probability of a random 
match higher than in a sample with more alleles present. 
If alleles are present at less than 7 loci, the sample may still be used for 
comparisons, but it will be “suitable for exclusionary purposes only.” If 
Sorensen cannot exclude someone because there is no direct inconsistency 
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between his profile and the crime scene sample’s partial profile, Sorensen will 
neither include or exclude him, but report that “no meaningful conclusions 
could be made to this known sample.” This protects against the inference that 
the individual is included. R.5426. And because no inclusionary conclusions 
have been made, Sorensen cannot provide an inclusionary statistic; the 
determination carries no statistical weight. R.5425,5427. If there is not enough 
data in a sample, Sorensen will deem the sample “inconclusive” and not use 
it for comparisons at all. R.5424-5425. 
Second, in response to SWGDAM’s guideline that labs should establish 
a procedure for including or excluding someone when a person’s full profile 
is not observed in the crime scene DNA sample, and after speaking with other 
labs, Sorensen established the use of “confirmatory replication 
amplification.” R.5413,9918-9919,9953. In this procedure, if Sorensen 
observes data below the analytical threshold that could be DNA—based on 
peak shape, bin position, and allele number—and it gives them pause in 
categorically excluding someone, they will conduct another “amplification 
event.” R.9954. For example, if a person’s DNA profile matches the crime 
scene sample’s profile at all 16 loci, but one allele at one locus is below the 
analytical threshold, and this allele is in the proper bin, and has the peak 
shape of true DNA, Sorensen may lack confidence in absolutely excluding 
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the person as a possible contributor to the sample. To better inform their 
decision to exclude or not, Sorensen analyzes the DNA sample a second time. 
It takes part of the original sample that has already been extracted and 
quantified, and begins anew at step three, amplification. R.5411-5412. If the 
same data is reproduced in the second event—the new electropherogram 
exhibits the same peaks in the same positions—Sorensen has more confidence 
that the below-threshold data is true DNA, although they cannot be 
“absolutely certain.” R.5431,9948,9953. Likewise, if the data is not 
reproduced, Sorensen has more confidence that the data is not true DNA, but 
a stochastic effect. R.5413,5431-5432. 
Sorensen picks one of the two “amplification events” to report, but uses 
the information from the other amplification event to inform its decision 
whether to exclude the individual or not. R.5409,5413. If Sorensen chooses not 
to exclude the individual based on this information, it will not include the 
below-threshold allele in its report, but will place an asterisk at that locus, 
which means the test was “inconclusive for the presence of additional 
alleles.” R.5420-5421. Sorensen also will not use asterisked loci in its 
probability calculations, making the inclusionary statistic lower. R.9955-9956. 
Both of these policies and procedures were scrutinized and “blessed” by 
outside accreditation bodies.  R.5453,9919-9920.  Sorensen has been 
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accredited by two separate accrediting bodies, including FBI Quality 
Assurance Standards, since 2007. R.5400-5403,8964,9908-9909. Accreditation 
confirms that Sorensen complies “with quality standards that are specific to 
forensic DNA testing” and that they have passed a “small-scale” audit every 
year and a “full-scale” audit every five years. R.5403-5405,8964,9908-9909. To 
pass an audit, auditors examine Sorensen’s standard operating procedures, 
their lab manual, their validation tests, their operations, and their policies and 
procedures for compliance. R.5403,8964. 
3. The DNA evidence. 
Emily Jeskie, Sorensen Forensics’ lead DNA analyst, performed the 
DNA testing in this case. She has a bachelor’s degree in molecular biology 
and, at the time of trial, had worked as a forensic DNA analyst for over twelve 
years. R.8961-8962; State’s Ex.467. She received specialized forensic DNA 
education, passed a certifying exam, attended yearly continuing education 
courses, and was proficiency tested every 6 months. R.8963. 
Ms. Jeskie analyzed several items from the crime scene: blood stains on 
the fitted sheet, Uta’s tank top, the purple towel, blood from one of the bloody 
footprints in the kitchen, the knife, scrapings from Uta’s right fingernails, 
Uta’s bed comforter, the white pillowcase, and a piece of fabric from the back 
seat of Defendant’s Subaru. R.8985,8990,8991,9008,9014,9020-9021. The tests 
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revealed that Defendant was a possible contributor to the DNA on the white 
pillowcase and on the comforter, and that Defendant could not be included 
or excluded as a possible contributor to the DNA under Uta’s right 
fingernails. R.4515. 
a. Defendant could not be included or excluded as a 
possible contributor to the Y-STR DNA under Uta’s 
righthand fingernails (item 2.0). 
Uta had a small amount of male DNA under her righthand fingernails, 
an “unusual” and “rare” finding. R.4481,9008-9011,9926. Because the sample 
was so degraded—likely because Uta had been under running water for so 
long—Ms. Jeskie was able to obtain only a partial profile using Y-STR 
analysis. R.4484,4521-4522,5294. Five loci were present, and Defendant’s 
alleles were the same as the sample on all 5 loci. R.4483-4484. 
Table 1. Comparison of Y-STR Profile from Scraping of Utah’s 







DYS389I 14 14 
DYS458 16 16 
DYS19 14 14 
DYS393 13 13 
DYS391 11 11 
Source: The data in this table is taken from State’s Exhibit 3 from 
the November 10, 2014 hearing, located in a manila envelope in 
Box 1 of the record.  
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Because there were not at least 7 loci present in the sample, however, 
Ms. Jeskie could not include Defendant as a possible contributor; the sample 
was suitable for exclusionary purposes only. R.4483-4484,4521,5294,5426, 
9010. Yet because there was also no direct inconsistency—Defendant’s alleles 
were the same as the sample’s—Defendant could not be excluded either. 
According to Sorensen Forensics’ policy, Ms. Jeskie thus determined that she 
could draw no conclusions as to Defendant. R.9011. She reported that she 
could make “no meaningful comparison[s]” between the profiles. Id. 
Ms. Jeskie, however, was able to exclude nine other males, including 
Nils, Jack Skalicky, the first responders, and the crime scene technicians 
because their alleles did not match the sample at at least one of the five 
present loci. R.5428,9013-9014. 
b. Defendant was a possible contributor to the autosomal 
STR DNA on Uta’s comforter (item 13.4). 
Ms. Jeskie tested five areas of Uta’s comforter. R.9016-9021. Four of the 
tests either excluded Defendant or were inconclusive for male DNA. Id. The 
fifth autosomal STR test, however, included Defendant as a possible 
contributor. R.9020; State’s Ex.173. In this test, Ms. Jeskie used the M-Vac 
process—“a DNA wet vac” that soaks an area with liquid, sucks it up, and 
then filters out the DNA—to test the bloodstain labeled 3D. R.5435,9020,9055- 
9056; State’s Ex.173. Bloodstain 3D was a bloody left handprint with a cloth 
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transfer swipe through it, possibly made by a glove. R.9020,13515- 
13516,13559; State’s Ex.173. 
The sample was mixed and had at least four contributors. R.9020; 
State’s Ex.173. Uta was the major contributor and Defendant and Nils were 
included as possible minor contributors with a probability statistic of 1 in Id. 
All of Defendant’s autosomal STR alleles—making up his complete and 
unique STR profile—were accounted for in the sample. R.9020- 
9021,9063,9065,9099. 
c. Defendant was a possible contributor to the Y-STR 
DNA on the bloodstain on Uta’s white pillowcase, but 
he was excluded on an autosomal STR test of the same 
stain (item 5.3). 
Ms. Jeskie performed three tests on Uta’s white pillowcase. R.9021. The 
first two tests analyzed the bloodstain on the pillowcase (item 5.3). Ms. Jeskie 
first swabbed the bloodstain and submitted it for Y-STR testing. R.9022, 9073- 
9074. Y-STR testing is helpful where, like here, there is a large amount of 
female DNA that can overwhelm and mask the presence of male DNA. 
R.4471, 8979-8980. Because a large amount of DNA appears as large peaks on 
the electropherogram, if the amount of male DNA is very low in comparison, 
its peaks may not be visible, although it is there. R.5284, 9924, 9938. Much like 
a window, the electropherogram captures only the landscape in front of it— 
in the case of overpowering female DNA, very high peaks. Id. Y-STR testing 
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can unmask this male DNA, however, by isolating it from the larger female 
contribution. R.4471, 8979-8980. 
Ms. Jeskie detected at least two Y-STR contributors, with Nils included 
as a possible major contributor with a probability of 1 in 2,841 and Defendant 
included as a possible minor contributor with a probability of 1 in 2,381. 
R.9023, 9073-9074. 
Ms. Jeskie later ran an autosomal STR test on the same bloodstain. 
R.9023. The STR test detected that at least three people contributed DNA to 
the sample and included Uta and Nils as possible contributors. R.9024, 9074- 
9075. Defendant, however, was excluded. Id. But because Uta’s blood would 
have overwhelmed the small amount of other DNA in the sample, it was not 
surprising that Defendant’s DNA did not appear on the electropherogram. 
R.4471, 5284, 8979-8980, 9938. 
d. Defendant was a possible contributor to the M-Vac 
collection of autosomal STR DNA on Uta’s white 
pillowcase (item 25.1). 
For the third and final test of the white pillowcase, Ms. Jeskie used the 
M-Vac process on a larger area of the white pillowcase and avoided the 
bloodstain. R.9023, 9025. The resulting electropherogram showed that all of 
Defendant’s autosomal STR alleles were present at every loci in the sample, 
although three of his alleles were below the analytical threshold. R.1509, 
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1513-1514, 5421-5422, 9093-9096. To obtain further information, Ms. Jeskie 
used Sorensen’s “confirmatory replication amplification” process and ran 
another amplification event. R.5422. She obtained the same results on the 
second event, except that one of Defendant’s alleles dropped out at locus 
FGA. R.9093-9096. 
Table 2. Comparison of M-Vac STR Profile from Second 
Amplification Event of Uta’s White Pillowcase (item 25.1) to 
Defendant’s STR Profile. 
Allele Locus 
White Pillowcase’s 




   10, 11, 12, 13, *(17 detected below 
the analytical threshold) 
13, 17 
D21 27, 29, 30, 31, 31.2 29 
D7 
  9, 11, 12, 13, *(10 detected below 
the analytical threshold) 
10, 11 
CSF1 10, 11, 13 11, 13 
D3 15, 16, 17, 18 15, 17 
TH01 6, 7, 9, 9.3 6, 7 
D13 8, 9, 12, 14 12, 14 
D16 9, 11, 12, 13 9, 12 
D2 
      19, 20, 22, *(25 detected below the 
analytical threshold) 
20, 25 
D19 13, 13.2, 14, 15, 15.2 14, 15 
vWA 17, 18, 19 17, 19 
TPOX 8, 10 8 
D18 12, 13, 15 12, 13 
AMEL X, Y X, Y 
D5 11, 12 11, 12 
 
FGA 
21, 22, 25 (26 detected above the 




Source: State’s Ex.387, Daniel Hellwig’s PowerPoint 
presentation, p.3-4.  
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Based on the information from both amplification events, Ms. Jeskie 
concluded that Defendant was a “possible” contributor to the sample. R.9025- 
9026, 9066. There were two other possible contributors to the sample—Uta 
and Nils—and all three contributors had a probability statistic of 1 in 197,000. 
R.9025-9026. Their combined alleles accounted for all the alleles in the 
sample. R.9913-9914. 
Ms. Jeskie used the second amplification in her report. R.5422; State’s 
Ex.387, attached at Add. _. As required by Sorensen’s policy, Ms. Jeskie did 
not report Defendant’s three alleles that were under the analytical threshold, 
nor did she report the allele that dropped out at locus FGA. R.5420-5421; 
State’s Ex.387. Ms. Jeskie instead put an asterisk at the three below-threshold 
loci and included the statement that those loci were “inconclusive for the 
presence of additional alleles.” R.5420-5421. Finally, Ms. Jeskie did not use 
those loci in her statistical calculations. R.9955-9956. 
4. Defendant moved in limine to exclude the State’s DNA 
evidence. 
Before trial, Defendant moved to exclude the DNA evidence from Uta’s 
righthand fingernails, Uta’s comforter, and Uta’s white pillowcase R.766-767, 
968, 1411-1445. He first argued that the results from the DNA analysis under 
Uta’s righthand fingernails (item 2.0) lacked “scientific reliability” under rule 
702, Utah Rules of Evidence, because Ms. Jeskie could make “‘no meaningful 
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comparisons’” between Defendant’s profile and the sample, a conclusion that 
“really mean[s] nothing.” R.770-776, 5603, 1348-13451. He further argued that 
the evidence was unfairly prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
because where other individuals had been excluded from contributing to the 
sample, but Defendant had not, it created the unjustified inference that 
Defendant was actually included as a possible contributor to the DNA 
sample. R.775-776, 1350-1352, 5603, 5606. 
As for the DNA evidence from the bloody handprint and glove swipe 
on Uta’s comforter (item 13.4), Defendant argued that its minimal probative 
value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under rule 403 
because Defendant’s autosomal STR profile was likely really his children’s 
DNA. R.972-973. If all four of his children’s DNA were present, Defendant 
contended, it would account for all of Defendant’s alleles and his autosomal 
STR profile would appear even if he never contributed any DNA to the 
sample. Id. Defendant, however, abandoned this challenge before the trial 
court ruled. R.5610. 
Defendant also argued that the results of the Y-STR analysis of the 
bloodstain on Uta’s white pillowcase (item 5.3) were unfairly prejudicial 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, because he was excluded on the 
autosomal STR test of the same stain. R.970-971, 1353-1354. He contended that 
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if both tests were considered together, the DNA must be his son Pelle’s, not 
Defendant’s. R.5609, 3153-1354. 
Defendant finally argued that Ms. Jeskie’s use of confirmatory 
replication amplification in her analysis of the M-Vac of the white pillowcase 
(item 25.1) was unreliable under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. He 
asserted that Ms. Jeskie should have excluded him as a possible contributor 
to the sample because data below the analytical threshold is not reliable and 
should always be disregarded. R.1355-1358. He further argued that Ms. Jeskie 
should have excluded Defendant because Defendant’s allele dropped out at 
locus FGA on the second amplification event—the event that Ms. Jeskie relied 
upon. Id. 
The trial court held an all-day evidentiary hearing and then heard oral 
argument on Defendant’s DNA motions. R.5601-5618. At the hearing, 
Defendant’s expert witness, Dr. Elizabeth Johnson testified, and Daniel 
Hellwig, Sorensen Forensics’ lab director, testified as an expert for the State. 
Ms. Jeskie had previously testified at Defendant’s preliminary hearing. 
Dr. Johnson first criticized Ms. Jeskie’s conclusion that she could not 
make any meaningful comparisons between Defendant’s profile and the 
DNA found under Uta’s right fingernails (item 2.0). Although she agreed that 
Ms. Jeskie correctly excluded the nine other individuals, Dr. Johnson asserted 
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that by not excluding Defendant, it was the “same thing as saying he’s 
included.” R.5299, 5388, 5398. And this, she said, violated SWGDAM’s 
guideline that all inclusionary comparisons contain a probability statistic. 
R.5280-5281, 5300, 5341-5345, 5388, 5405. 
Mr. Hellwig, the State’s expert and director of Sorensen Forensics, 
disagreed with Dr. Johnson’s conclusions. Although he agreed that not 
including or excluding Defendant as a possible contributor to the DNA under 
Uta’s fingernails (item 2.0) was a “paradox,” he explained that they could not 
conclude that the sample was inconclusive and not suitable for any 
comparisons because they could exclude the nine other individuals. R.5428. 
Mr. Hellwig explained that many forensic labs were confronting the same 
“paradox” where they could not exclude or include an individual and had 
come to the same conclusion as Sorensen Forensics: they would state that 
they could not exclude or include someone and also use a statement that 
indicates “there is no meaning in this comparison.” R.5432-5433, 5468. 
Dr. Johnson also testified that because Defendant was excluded on the 
autosomal STR test of the bloodstain on Uta’s white pillowcase, the Y-STR 
profile must belong to one of Defendant’s sons (item 5.3). R.5385. As a result, 
she claimed, Defendant should have been excluded from contributing to the 
Y-STR profile as well. Id. 
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Mr. Hellwig likewise disagreed that because Defendant was excluded 
from the autosomal STR test on the bloodstain on Uta’s white pillowcase 
(item 5.3), the Y-STR profile must be one of his sons’, and Defendant therefore 
must be excluded from the Y-STR test. R.5463,9922. Mr. Hellwig explained 
that when there is an overpowering amount of DNA from a major female 
contributor, a small amount of DNA from a minor male contributor will not 
show on an autosomal STR test. R.5463. But it will appear on the Y-STR test, 
he said, because the male DNA was isolated from the female. Id. Dr. Hellwig 
thus testified that it was “impossible” to conclude that Defendant should be 
excluded from both tests on the bloodstained pillowcase. R.5463. 
Dr. Johnson finally testified that Defendant should have been excluded 
as a contributor to the DNA collected by M-Vac on the white pillowcase (item 
25.1). R.5314. Although she agreed that all of Defendant’s alleles were 
accounted for in the sample, she stated that Ms. Jeskie should have 
disregarded the dropped allele at the FGA locus and any data below the 
analytical threshold. R.5315-5319, 5334-5335. Instrument noise below the 
analytical level, she said, was “too easy to confuse” with DNA. R.5269, 5391. 
 Mr. Hellwig did not agree that Defendant should be excluded from the 
DNA collected by M-Vac on the white pillowcase (item 25.1) because Ms. 
Jeskie considered data below the analytical threshold. R.5418. He said that 
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Dr. Johnson was applying the analytical threshold as a floor where “nothing 
exists” below it. R.5418. SWGDAM, he stated, did not require—or endorse— 
this interpretation. For Sorensen Forensics, the analytical threshold “is not a 
floor but a ceiling.” R.5406. Above the threshold, he explained, they can 
“rely” on the peaks to “be really truly DNA,” while below the threshold, they 
simply “lose confidence” that the data is DNA because it “is not as reliable.” 
R.5406-5407, 5418 (emphasis added). He confirmed that SWGDAM does not 
prohibit considering data below the analytical threshold and that several labs, 
including the Utah Crime Lab, use an asterisk or a star to designate data they 
detected below threshold. R.5406-5407, 5424. Indeed, to ignore relevant 
information, Mr. Hellwig testified, could make “an exclusion inaccurate.” 
R.5418, 5423. 
Mr. Hellwig further stated that although he was not aware of scholarly 
articles assessing the use of confirmatory replication amplifications, he 
learned the technique from the director of a forensic DNA lab and scientist at 
SWGDAM. R.5466. It was “basic science” he explained; “if you are able to 
reproduce an event, your confidence” in that event is “escalated.” R.5413, 
5431-5432. In fact, Mr. Hellwig said, SWGDAM approved the use of 
“composite profiles,” where data from more than one amplification event is 
not only considered, but is compiled into one profile. R.5408-5409. 
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5. The trial court denied Defendant’s motions to exclude the 
State’s DNA evidence and ruled that the parties could 
present their different interpretations of the evidence 
through expert testimony, cross-examination, and closing 
argument. 
The trial court denied Defendant’s motions to exclude the State’s 
introduction of the DNA evidence. See R.1702-1719, attached at Addendum 
C. In its rule 702 analysis, the court found that Ms. Jeskie’s and Mr. Hellwig’s 
education and experience qualified them as experts; and Sorensen Forensics, 
a nationally accredited lab that follows SWDAM guidelines, used 
methodologies for autosomal STR and Y-STR DNA analysis that are 
generally accepted and have been previously upheld by the Utah Supreme 
Court. R.1705-1706 (citing State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶132, 299 P.3d 892 and 
State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶27, 345 P.3d 1195). 
In its rule 403 analysis, the trial court noted that the DNA evidence 
under Uta’s fingernails was probative to (1) show that Uta had contact with 
a male close to the time of her death; (2) “help the jury determine whether a 
male individual played a role in the alleged victim’s death, as opposed to the 
death being a suicide or accident, as posited by Defendant”; (3) “show the 
police conducted a thorough investigation of the crime scene and were able 
to exclude nine potential contributors to the sample”; and (4) that on the day 
Uta died, “Defendant had a scratch on his face consistent with a human nail 
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and [he] made inconsistent statements regarding the scratch.” R.1705-1706, 
1708-1709. 
The trial court “agree[d] the State’s witness should not be allowed to 
indicate Defendant’s DNA profile was ‘not excluded’ from the sample without 
further explanation” because it could mislead the jury to believe that Defendant 
was actually included.” But the trial court ruled that “Ms. Jeskie may testify 
[that] ‘no meaningful comparison’ could be made to the Defendant’s sample 
or his lineage” provided that she also explain that “Defendant could not be 
excluded or included as a possible contributor to the sample.” R.1707 
(emphasis added). The trial court “caution[ed] the State to ensure its expert 
provides neutral testimony on this subject so as not to encourage the jury to 
draw an improper inference from the evidence.” R.1707. 
Second, the trial court ruled that admitting both the autosomal STR and 
Y-STR DNA tests of the bloodstain on the white pillowcase, (item 5.3), was 
not unfairly prejudicial under rule 403. R.1711. The trial court found that the 
State had provided a “reasonable explanation” for Defendant’s exclusion on 
the autosomal STR test and inclusion on the Y-STR test, and that the evidence 
was relevant to show the “extent of the police investigation and the results of 
the DNA testing.” R.1710-1711. The trial court explained that “both of these 
tests, if explained and reported accurately to the jury, are not substantially 
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prejudicial to the Defendant—especially when reported together.” Id. And it 
noted that Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the State’s 
witnesses “to expose any limitations of Y-STR testing” as well as “argue the 
significance of both test results during his closing argument.” Id. 
Finally, the trial court admitted the testimony about the M-Vac 
autosomal STR DNA test of the white pillowcase (item 25.1). The trial court 
found that it was “unclear” if Ms. Jeskie’s consideration of data below the 
analytical threshold was a generally accepted practice within the meaning of 
rule 702(c). But it found that the State made the alternative threshold showing 
of reliability under section 702(b) to support admitting Ms. Jeskie’s testimony 
based on consideration of data below the analytical threshold and to support 
her conclusion that Defendant was not excluded as a possible contributor to 
the sample. R.1714. The trial court ruled that Defendant’s objections went to 
the evidence’s weight, not its reliability. R.1714-1715. Although Defendant’s 
expert, Dr. Johnson, believed that data below the analytical threshold should 
never be considered, the trial court explained that “[m]ere disagreement 
among experts does not make the testimony unreliable.” R.1714. Rather, 
because “[b]oth experts have reasonable interpretations and applications of 
the data,” it was “not the court’s role to decide which expert is correct,” but 
the jury’s. R.1714. The trial court thus ruled that both parties could present 
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their view of this DNA evidence through expert witnesses, cross- 
examination, and closing argument. R.1714-1715. 
B. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to admit the 
State’s expert testimony about the M-Vac-collected DNA from 
Uta’s white pillowcase (item 25.1) where Defendant’s 
objections went to the evidence’s weight, not its admissibility. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion to exclude the State’s expert testimony about the M-Vac- 
collected DNA on Uta’s white pillowcase (item 25.1). Br.Aplt.45-46. 
Defendant contends that the trial court should have excluded Ms. Jeskie’s 
testimony about the M-Vac pillow-case sample because it fell below rule 
702(b)’s reliability requirement. This is so, he says, because she considered 
data below the analytical threshold. Br.Aplt.45-46. The trial court correctly 
ruled that Defendant’s complaints went to the evidence’s weight, not its 
admissibility. 
A witness may testify as an expert if that person “is qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” and “the 
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Utah R. 
Evid. 702(a). The expert’s methods must either be “generally accepted by the 
relevant expert community,” Utah R. Evid. 702(c), or as relevant here, meet 
“a threshold showing” that they (1) are reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient 
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facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.”  Utah R. Evid. 
702(b). 
 
The threshold showing of reliability under section (b) requires “only a 
basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability.” Utah R. Evid. 702, 
Advisory Committee Note. It allows experts “latitude to interpret the facts 
before them.” State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶39, 322 P.3d 624. The evidence’s 
proponent thus need not show that the expert’s methodology or conclusion 
“is indisputably correct.” Id. Nor does it need to show that the expert’s 
methods or conclusion “are free of controversy.” Utah R. Evid. 702, Advisory 
Committee Note. Rather, “contrary and inconsistent opinions may 
simultaneously meet the threshold,” id., and “[s]o-called ‘dueling experts’” 
may testify about their “opposite conclusions” drawn from the underlying 
evidence. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶77 n.9. 
Thus, admitting the evidence requires only a “‘threshold showing.’” 
Ultimate reliability—which methods, results, and conclusions are more 
convincing—remains for the jury to decide. Gunn Hill Dairy Properties, LLC v. 
Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, ¶33, 269 P.3d 980 
(emphasis in original). It “is for the factfinder to reconcile—or choose 
between—the different opinions,” Utah R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee 
Note, as it “bears the ultimate responsibility for evaluating the accuracy, 
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reliability, and weight, of the testimony.” Gunn Hill Dairy Properties, 2012 UT 
App 20, ¶47. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consequently cautioned that trial courts 
“must be careful not to displace the province of the factfinder to weigh the 
evidence,” State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶26, 345 P.3d 1195 (emphasis added), or 
attempt to “reconcile a conflict between experts.” Gunn Hill Dairy Properties, 
2012 UT App 20, ¶38-42; see also Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶77 n.9 (explaining that a 
“court exceeds its role when it bars expert testimony because it prefers one 
theory or researcher over another”). Instead, “‘[v]igorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of 
proof are the traditional and appropriate means” to test admissible evidence, 
even when it may be considered “‘shaky.’” Majors v. Owens, 2015 UT App 306, 
¶13, 365 P.3d 165, 169 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 596 (1993)). 
Here, Defendant disagrees that Ms. Jeskie should have considered data 
below the analytical threshold when determining whether Defendant was a 
possible contributor to the sample on the M-Vac-collected DNA on Uta’s 
pillowcase. Br.Aplt.45-46. According to Defendant’s expert, below-threshold 
data is unreliable and should never be considered; it is “too easy to confuse” 
instrument noise for DNA. R.5269,5391. Had the data been ignored, she said, 
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Defendant would have been definitively excluded as a source of the DNA. 
R.5315-5319,5334-5335. This is because in a mixed sample where several 
alleles are present at each loci, Defendant’s profile will appear to be in direct 
inconsistency with the sample profile if one of the sample’s alleles does not 
appear. Id. 
But the State explained why Ms. Jeskie—an experienced and specially 
trained forensic DNA analyst—came to a different conclusion. R.8961-8962; 
State’s Ex.467. Defendant’s entire autosomal STR profile was present in the 
M-Vac-collected sample, although three of his alleles were detected below the 
analytical threshold. R.1509,1513-1514,5421-5422,9093-9096. According to 
Sorensen Forensics’ policy, if an analyst observes data below the analytical 
threshold that could be DNA based on peak shape, bin position, and allele 
number, the analyst may amplify the sample again to see if the results are 
reproduced. If they are, the analyst has more confidence—although she 
cannot be sure—that the below-threshold peaks may be true DNA and not 
stochastic effects. R.9954-9955. This information helps to inform the analyst’s 
decision whether to exclude an individual as a source of the DNA—a 
determination that is categorical. R.5418,5423. In contrast, the determination 
that an individual is a possible contributor to a sample does not indicate that 
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he is an “actual” contributor, just that he is “a possible contributor.” R.9066 
(emphasis added). 
Ms. Jeskie performed a “confirmatory replication amplification” event 
to see if the results reproduced. R.5422. They did. Defendant’s profile was 
again present, except that one of Defendant’s above-threshold alleles 
dropped out. R.9093-9096. Using the information from both amplification 
events, Ms. Jeskie determined that Defendant should not be definitively 
excluded, but was a possible contributor to the sample. R.5421, 9025-9026, 
9066. 
Mr. Hellwig explained to the trial court that ignoring relevant below- 
threshold information can make “an exclusion inaccurate.” R.5418, 5423. He 
further explained that SWGDAM does not prohibit consideration of below- 
threshold data; the analytical threshold simply establishes where analysts can 
“rely” on peaks to “be really truly DNA.” R.5406-5407, 5418. Below the 
threshold, it “is not as reliable.” Id. (emphasis added). And Mr. Hellwig 
confirmed that Sorensen Forensics’ policy was scrutinized and “blessed” by 
two outside accreditation bodies. R.5453, 9919-9920. 
The disagreement between the State and defense experts over the 
conclusion to be drawn from the underlying DNA evidence is precisely the 
type of disagreement that rule 702 entrusts the jury to decide. Utah R. Evid. 
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702, Advisory Committee Note; see also State v. Bander, 208 P.3d 1242, 1252 
(Wash 2009) (holding that Bander’s challenge to DNA analyst’s consideration 
of “below- threshold” allele to not exclude Bander went to the evidence’s 
weight, not admissibility); People v. Russell, 2017 WL 2333983U at *2, 5-6 (Cal. 
App. 2017) (holding that Sorensen Forensics’ method of using confirmatory 
replication amplifications was reliable and Russell’s objection went to 
evidence’s weight not its admissibility). The trial court thus properly 
exercised its discretion to allow the jury to do its traditional job—determine 
which of two qualified, but competing expert opinions was more convincing. 
R.1712-1715. See Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶26. 
C. Defendant has not proved that all competent counsel would 
have objected to how the State presented and argued the DNA 
evidence at trial. 
Defendant finally argues that his trial counsel “was constitutionally 
ineffective” because he did not object when the State “mischaracterized the 
DNA evidence” through the State’s experts’ testimony and in the 
prosecutor’s closing argument. Br.Aplt.47-58. He contends that his counsel 
should have objected to (1) the State’s eliciting expert DNA testimony that, 
according to him, went beyond what the trial court permitted, and (2) the 
prosecutor overstating the DNA evidence in closing argument. 
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To prove that his trial counsel was ineffective, Defendant must prove 
both that (1) his counsel performed deficiently, and (2) he was prejudiced as 
a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 694 (1984); State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶19, 12 P.3d 92. This is a “heavy burden,” Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687–89, and “never an easy task,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 
86, 105 (2011). 
Deficient performance requires proof that trial counsel’s representation 
“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687–88. Counsel is always “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 
assistance.” Id. at 690. To show otherwise, Defendant must prove that “no 
competent attorney” would have proceeded as his attorney did. Premo v. 
Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011). This difficult burden recognizes that there 
“are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case,” and 
that “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular 
client in the same way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
Defendant has not met his burden. Even a cursory review of the 
pleadings and transcripts confirms that defense counsel vigorously 
advocated for Defendant from the moment they were hired and subjected the 
State’s case to the type of adversarial testing the Sixth Amendment demands. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (“The benchmark for judging any claim of 
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ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result.”). 
And Defendant’s argument is predicated on the assumption that 
Defendant was, or should have been, excluded as the source of the tested 
DNA. That may be his view, but the State views the evidence differently. 
After extensive briefing, argument, and an all-day hearing in which the 
parties’ experts explained their conflicting conclusions drawn from the 
evidence, the trial court allowed both sides to present their own theories of 
the DNA evidence to the jury. R.1702-1719. That Defendant still disagrees 
with the State’s conclusions does not mean that it “mischaracterized” the 
evidence. 
1. Neither the State’s experts nor the prosecutor went beyond 
the trial court’s admonition to provide “neutral testimony” 
about the partial Y-STR DNA profile found under Uta’s 
righthand fingernails (item 2.0), so trial counsel had no 
reason to object. 
Defendant first argues that his trial counsel should have objected 
when, according to him, the “State urged the jury to assume the DNA under 
Uta’s fingers was” Defendant’s. Br.Aplt.50. He argues that Ms. Jeskie’s 
testimony that nine individuals were excluded from the DNA test went 
beyond the trial court’s order to provide neutral testimony. Br.Aplt.49-50. 
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And he contends that the prosecutor’s statement in closing that he “‘would 
submit to you it was as if Uta was standing in this courtroom and pointing to 
the defendant as her killer,’” went beyond the trial court’s order as well. 
Br.Aplt.50 (quoting R.10141-10142). 
Defendant has not proved that all competent counsel would have 
objected to Ms. Jeskie’s testimony or the inferences the prosecutor drew from 
the evidence. To begin with, the trial court did not purport to limit the closing 
argument, only how the testimony came in. As recited in section II.A.5 above, 
the trial court ruled that “Ms. Jeskie may testify ‘no meaningful comparison’ 
could be made to the Defendant’s sample or his lineage” and the DNA under 
Uta’s fingernails “as long as she explains . . . [that] means Defendant could 
not be excluded or included as a possible contributor to the sample.” R.1707 
(emphasis added). The trial court “caution[ed] the State to ensure its expert 
provides neutral testimony on this subject so as not to encourage the jury to 
draw an improper inference from the evidence.” R.1707. But the trial court 
also explicitly ruled that testimony about exclusion of the nine other 
individuals on the DNA test was relevant and admissible. R.1705-1706,1708- 
1709. 
 Ms. Jeskie complied with the court’s ruling.   She did not tell the jury 
that Defendant’s profile was the same as the sample’s at the five present loci, 
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but testified only that Defendant “could not be excluded, could not be 
included. There were no conclusions that could be drawn.” R.9011. The 
PowerPoint that accompanied her testimony provided that “[d]ue to the low 
level/degraded nature of the sample, no meaningful comparison could be 
made [to Defendant].” State’s Ex.382, attached at Add. _. Because Ms. Jeskie’s 
testimony did not exceed what the trial court permitted, defense counsel had 
no reason to object. State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶26, 1 P.3d 546 (“Failure to 
raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
Once this evidence was in, “[c]ounsel for both sides” had “considerable 
latitude” in how they argued the evidence. Like Defendant’s counsel, the 
prosecutor had “the right to fully discuss from [his] perspective[] the 
evidence and all inferences and deductions it support[ed].” State v. Houston, 
2015 UT 40, ¶76, 353 P.3d 55 (quotation and citation omitted). When this 
Court reviews an attorney’s decision not to “object to a prosecutor’s 
statements during closing argument, the question is ‘not whether the 
prosecutor’s comments were proper, but whether they were so improper that 
counsel’s only defensible choice was to interrupt those comments with an 
objection.’” Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶76 (quoting Bussard v. Lockhart, 32 F.3d 322, 
324 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original)). So to succeed, Defendant must 
show that the prosecutor’s argument so far departed from the wide latitude 
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he had to draw inferences from the evidence that no competent counsel could 
choose not to object.  Defendant has not met that burden. See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689; Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶26. 
 Indeed, the improper inference that the trial court proscribed, was not, 
as Defendant contends, that the male DNA under Uta’s righthand fingernails 
could be Defendant’s. Rather, the improper inference was that the DNA 
analysis concluded that the DNA was Defendant’s. Id. The jury was thus free 
to infer that the cells under Uta’s fingernails were Defendant’s from facts 
other than the results of the DNA testing. In fact, the trial court’s in limine 
decision ruled that the fact that there was male DNA under Uta’s righthand 
fingernails was admissible because it had evidentiary value and significance 
independent of whether DNA testing could prove it was Defendant’s. R.1705- 
1706, 1708-1709. It was relevant to show that: 
• Uta had contact with a male close to the time of her death; 
• Uta was involved in a struggle; 
• a male played a role in Uta’s death, as opposed to her death being a 
suicide or accident; 
 
• the police conducted a thorough investigation of the crime scene and 
were able to exclude nine potential contributors to the sample; 
 
• every other person who either had a motive to harm Uta or may have 
touched Uta near her death were excluded; 
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• on the day that Uta died, Defendant had a scratch on his left eye and 
face consistent with a human nail; and 
 
• Defendant changed his story about what occurred the night Uta died 
to account for the possibility that the then-pending DNA analysis 
would conclude the DNA was his.  
 
In closing argument, the prosecutor accurately explained that there 
“wasn’t enough [DNA] to say anything about the defendant.” R.10163-10164. 
And when he said that “it was as if Uta was standing in this courtroom and 
pointing to the defendant as her killer,” R.10141-10142, he was not asserting 
that the DNA testing proved the DNA was Defendant’s. Rather, this 
statement came twenty-three transcript pages into the prosecutor’s 
summation of all the evidence pointing towards Defendant as Uta’s killer. See 
R.10119-10142. 
The statement was proper. The prosecutor had no obligation to accept 
Defendant’s view of the evidence, but had “the right to fully discuss from 
[his] perspective[] the evidence and all inferences and deductions it 
supports.” Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶76. The prosecutor drew the supportable 
inference that the evidence viewed globally pointed the finger at Defendant. 
Defendant has consequently also failed to prove that the prosecutor’s 
statement was “so improper that counsel’s only defensible choice was to 
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interrupt those comments with an objection.’” Id. (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original). His claim thus fails. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
2. The State followed the trial court’s direction to 
“accurately” report the results from the Y-STR and 
autosomal STR DNA tests from the bloodstain on Uta’s 
white pillowcase (item 5.3), so trial counsel had no reason 
to object. 
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel should have objected when 
the State let the jury think that Defendant was a possible contributor to the 
sample from the pillowcase bloodstain (item 5.3), “even though more 
comprehensive DNA testing excluded him.” Br.Aplt.50 (emphasis in original). 
According to Defendant, Mr. Hellwig’s testimony that he would not 
“‘conclude’” the Y-STR and autosomal STR tests were “linked” violated the 
trial court’s order that the tests be “reported together” as well as State v. 
Jones’s requirement that the Y-STR results “be presented in a fair and accurate 
manner.” Br.Aplt.50-52 (quoting R.1711). 
As a threshold matter, this Court should reject this argument because 
he has not challenged the trial court’s reasons for rejecting it below. Needham, 
2016 UT App 235, ¶2 (rejecting Needham’s challenge on appeal where he 
failed to address “the basis of the trial court’s ruling.”). 
Before trial, the trial court ruled that evidence of both the autosomal 
STR and Y-STR DNA tests of the bloodstain on the white pillowcase, (item 
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5.3), were admissible. R.1711. The trial court found that the State had 
provided a “reasonable explanation” that Defendant was excluded on the 
autosomal STR test, but included on the Y-STR test and that “both of these 
tests, if explained and reported accurately to the jury, are not substantially 
prejudicial to the Defendant—especially when reported together.” Id. It noted 
that Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the State’s witnesses 
“to expose any limitations of Y-STR testing” as well as “argue the significance 
of both test results during his closing argument.” Id. 
Post-verdict, Defendant moved to arrest judgment on the ground that 
the State violated both the trial court’s in limine order and State v. Jones’s 
requirement that the State accurately present the limitations of Y-STR DNA 
testing. R.2049-2059. In support, he argued that Mr. Hellwig and Ms. Jeskie 
“refused to concede that the two tests on the same unknown sample were 
linked,” but testified that the two DNA tests were “separate events.” R.2057- 
2058. 
The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, ruling that the State had 
neither violated its in limine order nor State v. Jones’s requirements. R.3477- 
3480. It found that the State “properly explained” and “spoke accurately 
about the test conclusions,” the “limitations of Y-STR DNA analysis,” and 
“the differences in generating statistics” between Y-STR and STR testing. 
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R.3478. The trial court also found that the State “repeatedly clarified that the 
Y-STR ‘match’ . . . meant a match to anyone in Defendant’s paternal line, and 
not a match to the unique STR profile of Defendant.” R.3478-3479. In addition, 
the trial court found that the State’s experts were qualified to testify and 
“nothing in this court’s pretrial order prevented the State’s expert from 
holding and testifying to a different expert opinion concerning item 5.3 than 
defendant’s expert.” R.3479. The trial court thus concluded that the State had 
“satisfied any requirements of State v. Jones [and] this court’s pretrial ruling.” 
R.3479. 
Because Defendant has not challenged these factual findings or legal 
conclusions on appeal, this Court should not address his claim. See State v. 
Hurt, 2010 UT App 33, ¶16, 227 P.3d 271 (explaining that because Hurt failed 
“to factually or legally challenge the district court’s ruling,” it would not 
disturb the district court’s ruling). 
But in any event, trial counsel had no reason to object because by the 
time Mr. Hellwig gave this testimony at trial, the trial court had rejected pre- 
trial the objections Defendant says his counsel should have re-raised at trial. 
See R.3478-3479. As the trial court noted, the State’s expert did not exceed 
what the trial court permitted, but “properly explained” and “spoke 
accurately about the test conclusions,” the “limitations of Y-STR DNA 
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analysis,” and “the differences in generating statistics” between Y-STR and 
STR testing. R.3478. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that all 
competent counsel are constitutionally obligated to repeated objections that 
have already been overruled. See Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶26 (“Failure to raise 
futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). This 
claim thus fails as well. 
3. The trial court ruled that both parties could present their 
interpretation of the M-Vac autosomal STR DNA test of 
the white pillowcase (item 25.1) through expert testimony, 
cross-examination, and closing argument; trial counsel 
thus had no reason to object when the State did what the 
trial court permitted it to do. 
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel should have objected when 
the prosecutor elicited testimony that Defendant’s “‘unique’” autosomal STR 
profile was “‘included as a possible contributor to the mixture’” of the M- 
Vac-collected DNA on Uta’s white pillowcase (item 25.1). Br.Aplt.53 (quoting 
R.9099). According to Defendant, this testimony “misrepresented” the 
evidence because Defendant’s “‘unique’ STR profile was not found in his 
sample—his alleles were not observed at reliable levels at four loci, meaning 
he was excluded.” Id. 
A competent attorney could choose not to object to this testimony 
because it fell sufficiently into what the trial court ruled was reliable. As 
discussed, Defendant argued pre-trial that Defendant should have been 
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excluded as a source of the DNA because three of his alleles were observed 
below the analytical threshold and one had dropped out on the second 
amplification event. R.1355-1358. But the State’s experts disagreed that 
Defendant should be categorically excluded as a contributor to the sample. 
Mr. Hellwig explained that the analytical threshold was not a floor, but a 
ceiling, and that ignoring relevant information could result in a false 
exclusion. R.5406-5407, 5418, 5423. Based on all the information before it, 
Sorensen Forensics determined that Defendant was a “possible” contributor 
to the sample where his alleles were present at all 16 loci, even though three 
were observed below threshold. R.9025-9026, 9066. 
The trial court declined to exclude this evidence. It determined that 
because “[b]oth experts have reasonable interpretations and applications of 
the data,” it was “not the court’s role to decide which expert is correct,” but 
the jury’s. R.1714. The trial court therefore ruled that both parties could 
present their contrary conclusions drawn from this DNA evidence through 
expert witnesses, cross-examination, and closing argument. R.1714-1715. 
This is what the parties did. The State presented its “reasonable 
interpretations” of the DNA evidence to the jury, as did Defendant. R.1714. 
Because the trial court explicitly permitted the State to present this theory to 
the  jury, any  objection counsel would  have made  would  have  been futile.  
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Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶26, 1 P.3d 546 (“Failure to raise futile objections does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
4. The State accurately presented the DNA evidence from the 
bloody handprint and glove swipe on Uta’s comforter 
(item 13.4), so trial counsel had no reason to object. 
Finally, Defendant argues that his counsel should have objected to the 
testimony about the M-Vac-collected DNA from the bloody handprint and 
glove swipe on Uta’s comforter (item 13.4). He contends that the State falsely 
presented the profile “as being unique” to Defendant, because, according to 
him, this “DNA is most likely from [Defendant]’s children, not [Defendant].” 
Br.Aplt.54. He further claims that the prosecutor “false[ly]” stated in closing 
argument that the DNA was collected from “pinpoint location” because, he 
claims, the M-Vac process “gathers from deep layers in areas of the fabric, not 
from a pinpoint location.” Br.Aplt.55. 
Ms. Jeskie tested five areas of Uta’s comforter. R.9016-9021. Four of the 
tests either excluded Defendant or were inconclusive for male DNA. Id. The 
fifth autosomal STR test, however, included Defendant as a possible 
contributor. R.9020; State’s Ex.173. In this test, Ms. Jeskie used the M-Vac 
process to test the bloodstain labeled 3D. R.5435, 9020, 9055-9056; State’s 
Ex.173. Bloodstain 3D was a bloody left handprint with a cloth transfer swipe 
through it, possibly made by a glove. R.9020, 13515-13516, 13559; State’s 
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Ex.173. All of Defendant’s autosomal STR alleles—making up his complete 
and unique STR profile—were accounted for in the sample. R.9020-9021, 
9063, 9065, 9099. 
Defendant moved to exclude this evidence but later withdrew his 
challenge. R.5610. Instead, he argued at trial through expert testimony and 
closing argument that the autosomal STR profile was likely really his 
children’s DNA because, according to him, if all four of his children’s DNA 
were present, it would account for all of Defendant’s alleles and Defendant’s 
autosomal STR profile would appear even if he never contributed any DNA 
to the sample. R.10240, 15266-15267, 1521-15282. And this was also the case 
for the autosomal STR profile on the white pillowcase (item 25.1), he argued. 
The State disagreed. In order for Defendant’s profile to appear, the State 
argued, all four children would have to donate the same amount of DNA at 
the same spot. Pelle and Malkie, however, testified that they never lay on 
Uta’s bed. And Defendant’s STR profile was located only at the glove- swipe 
spot on the comforter—a pinpoint location—not on the other four tested 
locations of the comforter. The simpler explanation, the State argued, was 
that Defendant touched the pillowcase and his gloved hand swiped through 
Uta’s bloody handprint on the comforter. 
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Again, Defendant’s difference of opinion to the conclusions to be 
drawn from this DNA test does not make the State’s view a 
“mischaracterization” or a false statement. Br.Aplt.54-55. Indeed, simply 
because the M-Vac process “gathers deep layers,” does not mean that the spot 
processed was not “pinpoint.” Br.Aplt.55. For this test, Ms. Jeskie used the 
M-Vac only on the spot with the bloodstained handprint and the glove swipe 
going through it—this is a pinpoint location regardless of how deep the 
vacuum went. R.5435, 9020, 9055-9056. The prosecutor’s statements were 
proper. 
In sum, the prosecutor had “the right to fully discuss from [his] 
perspective[] the evidence and all inferences and deductions it supports.” 
Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶76 (quotation and citation omitted). Because the 
prosecutor’s statements in closing argument were proper, Defendant cannot 
show—as he must—that the they were “so improper that counsel’s only 
defensible choice was to interrupt those comments with an objection.’” 
Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶76 (emphasis in original); State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 
750, 754 (Utah 1982) (explaining that prosecutor may fairly respond to 




C. Defendant cannot show prejudice on his DNA claims because 
he would have been convicted even without the DNA 
evidence. 
Defendant’s DNA claims also fail because he cannot show prejudice. 
Prejudice requires Defendant to affirmatively prove with nonspeculative 
evidence that without the alleged error there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” Id. In other words, “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be 
substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112 (emphasis added) 
(cleaned up). 
Defendant has not proved that in light of all the evidence and the jury 
instructions, excluding the DNA testimony or argument, would have made a 
more favorable outcome reasonably likely. Indeed, the DNA evidence in this 
case “played a relatively small probative role in the overall quantum of 
evidence that was presented to the jury.” R.3479. The DNA evidence was not 
“critical or indispensable evidence in support of the State’s case” and did not 
definitively prove that Defendant was present at the crime scene. Id. Rather, 
the DNA evidence was probative because, as the trial court put it, it “did not 
undermine the State’s theory of the case.” Id. Undoubtedly, the DNA 
evidence’s greatest import was not the actual test results or their 
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interpretation. Rather, its importance was that after the DNA analysis was in 
process, Defendant changed his account of the evening to create improbable 
explanations why his DNA may have been found at the crime scene and 
under Uta’s fingernails. 
Indeed, all the other evidence proved that Defendant was the only 
person with the opportunity, means, and motive to kill Uta. He had the 
medical knowledge necessary to select the drug that would incapacitate her, 
and he knew how to forcefully administer it to her. He had obtained a 
prescription for the strongest possible dosage of Xanax. He knew where the 
spare key was hidden to access Uta’s home. He knew Uta’s schedule and 
when she would be home alone. Defendant was not home at the time Uta was 
killed and he lied about his whereabouts. That morning, he arrived late to 
work and took his car to be washed even though patients were waiting for 
him. Defendant had not changed his clothes from the day before, he had a 
scratch on his left eye and cheek consistent with a human nail, and his 
eyeglasses were broken on the left side. When police questioned Defendant 
that evening, he did not ask why they wanted to talk to him. And he told 
them that he could not remember almost everything he had done the night 
before. Yet months later, he gave a detailed account of that night in an 
unbelievable story that was not only inconsistent with what he had 
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previously old the police, but that would potentially account for the pending 
DNA tests. And finally, Defendant was the only person who hated Uta, the 
woman whom he believed had ruined his life and had recently filed to 
modify custody. He had expressed to others his wish that Uta were dead and 
after Uta died, he told his son that it was better that she was gone. 
In addition, trial counsel was able to minimize the impact of the DNA 
evidence anyway. Counsel vigorously cross-examined Ms. Jeskie and Mr. 
Hellwig and presented his own expert, Dr. Johnson, to testify. Dr. Johnson 
not only criticized Sorensen Forensics’ methods and conclusions, but she also 
testified that, in her opinion, Defendant was definitively excluded as a 
contributor to the M-Vac-collected DNA on the white pillowcase and that the 
appearance of Defendant’s autosomal STR DNA profile on the pillowcase 
and comforter was likely actually from his children. R.15276-15279, 15281- 
15282. Through cross-examination, both Ms. Jeskie and Mr. Hellwig admitted 
that they could not be sure that data below the analytical threshold was true 
DNA. And Dr. Johnson not only criticized Sorensen Forensics’ methods and 
conclusions in including Defendant as a possible contributor to the sample, 
but she also testified that, in her opinion, Defendant was definitively 
excluded as a contributor to the sample. R.15276-15279,15281-15282. Dr. 
Johnson further testified that if all four of Defendant’s children’s DNA were 
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present, it would account for all of Defendant’s alleles, and his autosomal STR 
profile would appear even if his DNA were not actually present. And finally, 
trial counsel attacked the DNA evidence in his closing argument, arguing that 
Sorensen Forensics’ methods were unreliable, and its conclusions were 
wrong. The jury was thus well-informed of Defendant’s theory of the DNA 
evidence and knew that this DNA evidence was not conclusive. 
And finally, trial counsel attacked the DNA evidence in his closing 
argument, arguing that Sorensen Forensics’ methods were unreliable, and its 
conclusions were wrong. The jury was thus well-informed of Defendant’s 
theory of the DNA evidence and knew that the DNA evidence was not 
conclusive in this case. 
Defendant, therefore, has failed to meet his burden. There is no 
likelihood a different result. Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. Even without the DNA 
evidence, the jury would have convicted. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.  
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